Automated banking machine that outputs interference signals to jam reading ability of unauthorized card reader devices

ABSTRACT

A banking system is controlled responsive to data read from data bearing records. The system comprises an automated banking machine. The machine includes at least one type of data reader, which includes a card reader. The machine also includes an anti-fraud arrangement that can deter effective operation of unauthorized devices attached to the machine. Such unauthorized devices may include a fraudulent card reader placed adjacent to a card entry slot that leads to the card reader. The arrangement can sense a fraudulent card reader installed on the machine. The arrangement can additionally emit jamming signals that interfere with an ability of a sensed fraudulent card reader to accurately read card data.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.14/092,676, now U.S. Pat. No. 9,203,548, filed Nov. 27, 2013, whichclaims benefit pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §119(e) of U.S. ProvisionalApplication 61/730,319 filed Nov. 27, 2012.

TECHNICAL FIELD

This disclosure generally relates to a banking system machine with acard reader.

BACKGROUND OF INVENTION

Automated banking machines may include a card reader that operates toread data from a bearer record such as a user card. The automatedbanking machine may operate to cause the data read from the card to becompared with other computer stored data related to the bearer. Themachine operates in response to the comparison determining that thebearer is an authorized system user to carry out at least onetransaction which is operative to transfer value to or from at least oneaccount. A record of the transaction is also commonly printed throughoperation of the automated banking machine and provided to the user. Acommon type of automated banking machine used by consumers is anautomated teller machine. An automated teller machine reads customercards and enables customers to carry out banking transactions. Bankingtransactions carried out using automated teller machines may include thedispensing of cash, the making of deposits, the transfer of fundsbetween accounts and account balance inquiries. The types of bankingtransactions a customer can carry out are determined by the capabilitiesof the particular banking machine and the programming of the institutionoperating the machine.

Other types of automated banking machines may be operated by merchantsto carry out commercial transactions. These transactions may include,for example, the acceptance of deposit bags, the receipt of checks orother financial instruments, the dispensing of rolled coin or othertransactions required by merchants. Still other types of automatedbanking machines may be used by service providers in a transactionenvironment such as at a bank to carry out financial transactions. Suchtransactions may include for example, the counting and storage ofcurrency notes or other financial instrument sheets, the dispensing ofnotes or other sheets, the imaging of checks or other financialinstruments, and other types of service provider transactions. Forpurposes of this disclosure an automated banking machine, automatedtransaction machine, or an automated teller machine (ATM) shall bedeemed to include any machine that may be used to automatically carryout transactions involving transfers of value.

OVERVIEW OF EXAMPLE EMBODIMENTS

In an example embodiment, there is described herein an automated bankingmachine which comprises an automated teller machine (ATM). The machineincludes a plurality of transaction function devices. The plurality oftransaction function devices include a card reader that is operative toread data included on cards of machine users. In an example embodimentthe transaction function devices include input and output devices whichare part of a user interface. In an example embodiment, the transactionfunction devices also include devices for carrying out types of bankingtransactions such as a currency dispenser device and a deposit acceptingdevice. The example machine described herein may also include a computerwhich may referred to herein as a processor or controller, that isoperative to cause the operation of the transaction function devices inthe machine. In an example embodiment, the ATM is capable of detectingdevices such as unauthorized card reader that may be coupled with theATM's card reader. The ATM is further capable of implementing defensivemeasures to impair the functionality of the unauthorized card readerthat are described in examples embodiments herein.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is an isometric external view of an example automated bankingmachine which incorporates some aspects and features of embodimentsdescribed in the present application.

FIG. 2 is a front plan view of the machine shown in FIG. 1.

FIG. 3 is a transparent side view showing schematically some internalfeatures of the machine.

FIG. 4 is a schematic view representative of the software architectureof an example embodiment.

FIG. 5 is a front view showing the fascia portion moved to access afirst portion of an upper housing of the machine.

FIG. 6 is a partially transparent side view of the machine.

FIG. 7 is an isometric view of the machine shown in FIG. 1 with thecomponents of the upper housing portion removed.

FIG. 8 is a schematic side view of the housing showing schematically theillumination system for the transaction areas and representing inphantom the movement of the upper fascia portion so as to provide accessfor servicing.

FIG. 9 is a schematic view of an illumination and anti-fraud sensingdevice which bounds a card reader slot of an example embodiment.

FIG. 10 is a schematic side view of an unauthorized card reading devicein operative connection with a housing of the anti-fraud sensor.

FIG. 11 is a schematic view of example logic for purposes of detectingthe presence of an unauthorized card reading device in proximity to thecard reader during operation of the machine.

FIG. 12 is an example side, cross sectional view of a machine keypad.

FIG. 13 is a schematic representation of a sensor for sensing whether anunauthorized key input sensing device has been placed adjacent to thekeypad.

FIG. 14 is a view of a keypad similar to FIG. 12 but with anunauthorized key input sensing device attached.

FIG. 15 is a schematic representation similar to FIG. 13, butrepresenting the change in reflected radiation resulting from theattachment of the unauthorized key input sensing device.

FIG. 16 is a schematic view of an anti-fraud device disposed within aslot of a card reader.

FIG. 17 is a schematic view of an unauthorized card reading devicemounted adjacent the card reader.

FIG. 18 is a schematic view of an alternate embodiment utilizingradiation emitters to emit radiation detectable by an anti-fraud device.

FIG. 19 is a schematic view of yet a further alternative embodiment ofan anti-fraud device.

FIG. 20 is a schematic view of an example apparatus for detecting thepresence of an unauthorized device in connection with a machine.

FIG. 21 is a schematic of example gain circuitry used in connection withan example radiation sensing device.

FIG. 22 is a schematic view of example logic flow carried out inconnection with the apparatus of FIG. 20.

FIG. 23 is a schematic view of an alternative example apparatus fordetecting the presence of an unauthorized device in connection with amachine.

FIG. 24 is a schematic of example circuitry used in connection with theexample apparatus of FIG. 23.

FIG. 25 is a front view of a fascia of an alternative automated bankingmachine.

FIG. 26 is a partial isometric view of a fascia of an automated bankingmachine showing the area of the card reader slot.

FIG. 27 is an isometric view showing the bezel surrounding the cardreader slot.

FIG. 28 is an isometric view of a card reader bezel similar to FIG. 26.

FIGS. 28A, 28B, and 28C show different views of a bezel that is similarto the bezel shown in FIG. 28.

FIG. 29 is an exploded rear view of the card reader bezel assembly.

FIG. 30 is a front isometric view of an ATM fascia with an alternativecard reader bezel.

FIG. 31 is an isometric view of the card reader bezel shown in FIG. 30.

FIGS. 31 A, 31 B, and 31 C show different views of a bezel that issimilar to the bezel shown in FIG. 31.

FIG. 32 is an isometric view of an alternative card reader bezel. FIGS.32A, 32B, and 32C show different views of a bezel that is similar to thebezel shown in FIG. 32.

FIG. 33 is an isometric view of an alternative card reader bezel. FIGS.33A, 33B, and 33C show different views of a bezel that is similar to thebezel shown in FIG. 33.

FIG. 34 is an isometric view of an alternative card reader bezel. FIGS.34A, 34B, and 34C show different views of a bezel that is similar to thebezel shown in FIG. 34.

FIG. 35 is an isometric view of an alternative card reader bezel. FIGS.35A, 35B, and 35C show different views of a bezel that is similar to thebezel shown in FIG. 35.

FIG. 36 is an isometric view of an alternative card reader bezel. FIGS.36A, 36B, and 36C show different views of a bezel that is similar to thebezel shown in FIG. 36.

FIG. 37 is an isometric view of an alternative card reader bezel. FIGS.37 A, 37B, and 37C show different views of a bezel that is similar tothe bezel shown in FIG. 37.

FIG. 38 is an isometric view of an alternative card reader bezel. FIGS.38A, 38B, and 38C show different views of a bezel that is similar to thebezel shown in FIG. 38.

FIG. 39 is an isometric view of an alternative card reader bezel. FIGS.39A, 39B, and 39C show different views of a bezel that is similar to thebezel shown in FIG. 9 reader.

FIG. 40 is an exploded view of an alternative card reader bezelstructure and a card

FIG. 41 shows a front view of an example card reader bezel with aparticular contour.

FIG. 42 shows a front view of an example bezel that includes asee-through window.

FIG. 43 shows a top view of the interior of a card reader.

FIG. 44 shows a top view of an example rotatable bezel section having asubstantially rectangular shape.

FIG. 45 shows an angled side view of the bezel section shown in FIG. 44.

FIG. 46 shows a top view of an example rotatable bezel section having asubstantially triangular shape.

FIG. 47 shows an angled side view of the bezel section shown in FIG. 44.

FIG. 48 shows a front view of the outer face of an example bezel.

FIG. 49 shows a side view taken along A-A in FIG. 48, with projectionsretracted.

FIG. 50 shows a side view taken along A-A in FIG. 48, with projectionsextended.

FIG. 51 shows a top view of a bezel's flexible outer surface in anexpanded condition.

FIG. 52 shows a front view of the bezel shown in FIG. 51.

FIG. 53 shows a top view of an example arrangement that uses physicalcontact to outwardly stretch a portion of a bezel's flexible outersurface to create a moving dislodging wave across the surface.

FIG. 54 shows an angled view of a wave creating component used in FIG.53.

FIG. 55 is an exploded view of a portion of a machine fascia and akeypad cover.

FIG. 56 shows the portion of the machine fascia of FIG. 55 including thekeypad cover installed thereon.

FIG. 57 is a schematic view of a portion of the fascia including thekeypad cover including certain sensors for detecting fraud devices.

FIG. 58 shows a coil emitter adjacent a card net slot.

FIG. 59 shows directional emitters adjacent a card entrance slot.

FIG. 60 shows corresponding relationships among a magnetic stripe,magnetic flux, bits, and waveform.

FIG. 61 shows an example of an example jammer.

FIG. 62 shows an example of a waveform representation caused bygeneration by an example jamming signal.

FIG. 63 shows magnetic flux reversals caused by the example jammingsignal.

FIG. 64 shows false card data generated by the example jamming signal.

FIG. 65 shows the false magnetic stripe segment which is imitated in theexample jamming signal.

DESCRIPTION OF EXAMPLE EMBODIMENTS

The following applications are incorporated herein by reference in theirentirety: U.S. application Ser. No. 12/288,333 filed Oct. 17, 2008; Ser.No. 13/134,654 filed Jun. 13, 2011; Ser. No. 13/199,106 filed Aug. 19,2011; Ser. No. 11/975,375 filed Oct. 19, 2007; Ser. No. 11/454,257 filedJun. 16, 2006; Ser. No. 10/832,960 filed Apr. 27, 2004; and Ser. No.10/601,813 filed Jun. 3, 2003; and US. Provisional Applications61/000,215 filed Oct. 24, 2007; 61/000,335 filed Oct. 25, 2007;60/429,478 filed Nov. 26, 2002; 60/560,674 filed Apr. 7, 2004;60/853,098 filed Oct. 20, 2006; 61/628,513 filed Nov. 1, 2011; and61/629,900 filed Nov. 30, 2011.

Referring now to the drawings and particularly to FIG. 1, there is showntherein an example embodiment of an automated banking machine generallyindicated 10. In an example embodiment automated banking machine 10 is adrive up ATM, however the features described and claimed herein are notnecessarily limited to machines of this type. The example machineincludes a housing 12. Housing 12 includes an upper housing area 14 anda secure chest area 16 in a lower portion of the housing. Access to thechest area 16 is controlled by a chest door 18 which when unlocked byauthorized persons in the manner later explained, enables gaining accessto the interior of the chest area.

The example machine 10 further includes a first fascia portion 20 and asecond fascia portion 22. Each of the fascia portions is movably mountedrelative to the housing as later explained, which in an exampleembodiment facilitates servicing.

The machine includes a user interface generally indicated 24. Theexample user interface includes input devices such as a card reader 26(shown in FIG. 3) which is in operative connection with a card readerslot 28 (FIG. 1) which extends in the second fascia portion. The cardreader slot 28 can lead to a card accepting area (e.g., a card entranceor opening) of the card reader 26. The card reader 26 is operative toread data bearing records presented by machine users. Such records caninclude data corresponding to at least one of the associated user, oneor more user financial accounts, and/or other data. In some exampleembodiments the card reader may read the data from magnetic stripecards. In other example embodiments the card reader may be operative toread data from other card or record types such as contactless cards. Ofcourse these approaches are example.

The user interface 24 can also include other reader devices, such as abiometric reader. A biometric reader can read user biometric data. Forexample, user biometric information may involve one or more of afingerprint, thumbprint, hand scan (e.g., palm print or back of hand),iris scan, retina scan, fingernail print, spoken password, voice print,voice (speech) recognition, image data, face topography data, facialrecognition, DNA scan, etc., or combinations thereof. Read biometricdata (or indicia) can be used for purposes of identifying a particularuser and/or their account. For example, biometric data can be used toverify that a person is authorized to use a cash dispensing automatedbanking machine. Read biometric data can also be compared to read carddata. Correlation of biometric data and card data can result in customerauthorization.

Other input devices of the example user interface 24 include functionkeys 30 and a keypad 32. The example machine 10 also includes a camera34 which also may serve as an input device for biometric features andthe like. The example user interface 24 also includes output devicessuch as a display 36. Display 36 is viewable by an operator of themachine when the machine is in the operative condition through anopening 38 in the second fascia portion 22. Further output devices inthe example user interface include a speaker 40. A headphone jack 42also serves as an output device. The headphone jack may be connected toa headphone provided by a user who is visually impaired to provide theuser with voice guidance in the operation of the machine. The examplemachine further includes a receipt printer 44 (see FIG. 3) which isoperative to provide users of the machine with receipts for transactionsconducted. Transaction receipts are provided to users through a receiptdelivery slot 46 which extends through the second fascia portion.Example receipt printers that may be used in some embodiments are shownin U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,729,379 and 5,850,075, the disclosures of which areincorporated by reference herein in their entirety. It should beunderstood that these input and output devices of the user interface 24are example and in other embodiments, other or different input andoutput devices may be used.

In an example embodiment the second fascia portion has included thereona deposit envelope providing opening 48. Deposit envelopes may beprovided from the deposit envelope providing opening to users who mayplace deposits in the machine. The second fascia portion 20 alsoincludes a fascia lock 50. Fascia lock 50 is in operative connectionwith the second fascia portion and limits access to the portion of theinterior of the upper housing behind the fascia to authorized persons.In an example embodiment fascia lock 50 comprises a key type lock.However, in other embodiments other types of locking mechanisms may beused. Such other types of locking mechanisms may include for example,other types of mechanical and electronic locks that are opened inresponse to items, inputs, signals, conditions, actions or combinationsor multiples thereof.

The example machine 10 further includes a delivery area 52. Deliveryarea 52 is in connection with a currency dispenser device 54 which isalternatively referred to herein as a cash dispenser, which ispositioned in the chest portion and is shown schematically in FIG. 3.The delivery area 52 is a transaction area on the machine in whichcurrency sheets are delivered to a user. In an example embodiment thedelivery area 52 is positioned and extends within a recessed pocket 56in the housing of the machine.

Machine 10 further includes a deposit acceptance area 58. The depositacceptance area is an area through which deposits such as depositenvelopes to be deposited by users are placed in the machine. Thedeposit acceptance area 58 is in operative connection with a depositaccepting device positioned in the chest area 16 of the machine. Exampletypes of deposit accepting devices are shown in U.S. Pat. Nos. 4,884,769and 4,597,330, the disclosures of which are incorporated herein byreference in their entirety.

In an example embodiment the deposit acceptance area serves as atransaction area of the machine and is positioned and extends within arecessed pocket 60. It should be understood that while an exampleembodiment of machine 10 includes an envelope deposit accepting deviceand a currency sheet dispenser device, other or different types oftransaction function devices may be included in automated bankingmachines. These may include for example, check and/or money orderaccepting devices, ticket accepting devices, stamp accepting devices,card dispensing devices, money order dispensing devices and other typesof devices which are operative to carry out transaction functions.

In this example embodiment the machine 10 includes certain illuminatingdevices which are used to illuminate transaction areas, some of whichare later discussed in detail. First fascia portion 20 includes anillumination panel 62 for illuminating the deposit envelope providingopening. Second fascia portion 22 includes an illumination panel 64 forilluminating the area of the receipt delivery slot 46 and the cardreader slot 28. Further, an illuminated housing 66 later discussed indetail, bounds the card reader slot 28. Also, in an example embodimentan illuminating window 68 is positioned in the recessed pocket 56 of thedelivery area 52. An illuminating window 70 is positioned in therecessed pocket 60 of the deposit acceptance area 58. It should beunderstood that these structures and features are example and in otherembodiments other structures and features may be used.

As schematically represented in FIG. 3, the machine 10 includes one ormore internal computers which are alternatively referred to herein ascontrollers. Such internal computers include one or more processors.Such processors may be alternatively referred to herein as computers.Such processors may be in operative connection with one or more datastores. In some embodiments processors may be located on certain deviceswithin the machine so as to individually control the operation thereof.Examples such as multi-tiered processor systems are shown in U.S. Pat.Nos. 6,264,101 and 6,131,809, the disclosures of which are incorporatedherein by reference in their entirety. Alternatively in otherembodiments, the at least one processor associated with the machine mayoperate in a remote server which is remotely located from the machine.Such a remote server may operate a virtual machine and control thedevices thereof in the manner described in U.S. patent application Ser.No. 13/066,272 filed Apr. 11, 2011, the disclosure of which isincorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

For purposes of simplicity, an example embodiment will be described ashaving a single controller which controls the operation of deviceswithin the machine. However it should be understood that such referenceshall be construed to encompass multicontroller and multiprocessorsystems as well as remote systems as may be appropriate in controllingthe operation of a particular machine. As a result, the example machineis associated with at least one computer, which can include an internaland/or an external (e.g., remote) computer(s).

In FIG. 3 a machine controller is schematically represented 72. Asschematically represented, the controller is in operative connectionwith one or more data stores 79. Such data stores in an exampleembodiment are operative to store program instructions, values, andother information used in the operation of the machine. Although acontroller 72 is schematically shown in the upper housing portion of themachine 10, it should be understood that in alternative embodimentscontrollers may be located within various portions of the machine.

In order to conduct transactions the example machine 10 communicateswith remote computers. The remote computers are operative to exchangemessages with the machine and authorize and record the occurrence ofvarious transactions. This is represented in FIG. 3 by the communicationof the machine through a network with a bank 78, which has at least onecomputer which is operative to exchange messages with the machinethrough a network. For example, the bank 78 may receive one or moremessages from the machine requesting authorization to allow a customerto withdraw $200 from the customer's account. The remote computer at thebank 78 will operate to determine that such a withdrawal is authorizedand will return one or more messages to the machine through the networkauthorizing the transaction. In example embodiments at least oneprocessor in the machine is operative to cause the communication of datacorresponding to data read from a user's card from the machine to theremote computer as part of one or more messages. The machine may alsocommunicate other data corresponding to user inputs such as a personalidentification number (PIN) and requested transaction data to the remotecomputer. The remote computer operates to compare the data correspondingto card data and/or PIN data to data corresponding to authorized usersand/or financial accounts stored in at least one data store associatedwith the remote computer. Responsive to the data corresponding to anauthorized user or financial account and a permissible transactionrequest, the remote computer communicates at least one message to themachine which corresponds to authorization to carry out the requestedtransaction. After the machine conducts the functions to accomplish atransaction such as dispensing cash, the machine will generally send oneor more messages back through the network to the bank indicating thatthe transaction was successfully carried out. Of course these messagesare merely example.

It should be understood that in some embodiments the machine maycommunicate with other entities and through various networks. Forexample as schematically represented in FIG. 3, the machine willcommunicate with computers operated by service providers 80. Suchservice providers may be entities to be notified of status conditions ormalfunctions of the machine as well as entities who are to be notifiedof corrective actions. An example of such a system for accomplishingthis is shown in U.S. Pat. No. 5,984,178, the disclosure of which isincorporated herein by reference in its entirety. Other third partieswho may receive notifications from example machines include entitiesresponsible for delivering currency to the machine to assure that thecurrency supplies are not depleted. Other entities may be responsiblefor removing deposit items from the machine. Alternative entities thatmay be notified of actions at the machine may include entities whichhold marketing data concerning consumers and who provide messages whichcorrespond to marketing messages to be presented to consumers. Varioustypes of messages may be provided to remote systems and entities by themachine depending on the capabilities of the machines in variousembodiments and the types of transactions being conducted.

FIG. 4 shows schematically an example software architecture which may beoperative in the controller 72 of machine 10. The example softwarearchitecture includes an operating system such as for example Microsoft®Windows, IBM OS/2® or Linux. The example software architecture alsoincludes an ATM application 82. The example application includes theinstructions for the operation of the automated banking machine and mayinclude, for example, an Agilis® 91 x application that is commerciallyavailable from Diebold, Incorporated which is a cross vendor softwareapplication for operating ATMs. Further examples of softwareapplications which may be used in some embodiments are shown in U.S.Pat. Nos. 6,289,320 and 6,505,177, the disclosures of which areincorporated herein by reference in their entirety.

In an example embodiment middleware software schematically indicated 84is operative in the controller. In an example embodiment the middlewaresoftware operates to compensate for differences between various types ofautomated banking machines and transaction function devices usedtherein. The use of a middleware layer enables the more ready use of anidentical software application on various types of machine hardware. Inan example embodiment the middleware layer may be Involve® softwareproduced by Nexus Software, or middleware software produced by KoralaAssociates Limited of Scotland.

The example software architecture further includes a diagnostics layer86. The diagnostics layer 86 is operative as later explained to enableaccessing and performing various diagnostic functions of the deviceswithin the machine. In an example embodiment the diagnostics operate inconjunction with a browser schematically indicated 88.

The example software architecture further includes a service providerlayer schematically indicated 90. The service provider layer may includesoftware such as WOSA XFS service providers or J/XFS service providerswhich present a standardized interface to the software layers above andwhich facilitate the development of software which can be used inconjunction with different types of machine hardware. Of course thissoftware architecture is example and in other embodiments otherarchitectures may be used.

As schematically represented in FIG. 4, a controller 72 is in operativeconnection with at least one communications bus 92. The communicationsbus may in some example embodiments be a universal serial bus (USB) orother standard or nonstandard type of bus architecture. Thecommunications bus 92 is schematically shown in operative connectionwith transaction function devices 94. The transaction function devicesinclude devices in the machine which are used to carry out transactions.These may include for example the currency dispenser 54, card reader 26,receipt printer 44, keypad 32, as well as numerous other devices whichare operative in the machine and controlled by the controller to carryout transactions.

Furthermore, communication between the controller and the transactionfunction devices can be encrypted. For example, encryption codes (orkeys) can be stored in a data store associated with the transactionfunction device (e.g., a card reader). The transaction function device(e.g., a card reader) can authenticate itself to the controller, andvice versa. Thus, the use of encryption allows data read from a card tobe protected during a transaction with the machine. An encrypted readhead can be used in the card reader. Examples of encryption applicationswhich may be used in some embodiments are shown in U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 12/802,496 filed Jun. 8, 2010, the disclosure ofwhich is herein incorporated by reference in its entirety.

In an example embodiment one of the transaction function devices inoperative connection with the controller is a diagnostic article readingdevice 96 which may be operative to read a diagnostic articleschematically indicated 98 which may provide software instructionsuseful in servicing the machine. Alternatively and/or in addition,provision may be made for connecting the bus 92 or other devices in themachine computer device 100 which may be useful in performing testing ordiagnostic activities related to the machine.

In an example embodiment of machine 10 the first fascia portion 20 andthe second fascia portion 22 are independently movably mounted on themachine housing 12. This is accomplished through the use of hingesattached to fascia portion 20. The opening of the fascia lock 50 on thefirst fascia portion 20 enables the first fascia portion to be moved toan open position as shown in FIG. 5. In the open position of the firstfascia portion an authorized user is enabled to gain access to a firstportion 102 in the upper housing area 14. In an example embodiment thereis located within the first portion 102 a chest lock input device 104.In this embodiment the chest lock input device comprises a manualcombination lock dial, electronic lock dial or other suitable inputdevice through which a combination or other unlocking inputs or articlesmay be provided. In this embodiment, input of a proper combinationenables the chest door 18 to be moved to an open position by rotatingthe door about hinges 106. In an example embodiment the chest door isopened once the proper combination has been input by manipulating alocking lever 108 which is in operative connection with a boltwork. Theboltwork which is not specifically shown, is operative to hold the chestdoor in a locked position until the proper combination is input. Uponinput of the correct combination the locking lever enables movement ofthe boltwork so that the chest door can be opened. The boltwork alsoenables the chest door to be held locked after the activities in thechest portion have been conducted and the chest door is returned to theclosed position. Of course in other embodiments other types ofmechanical or electrical locking mechanisms may be used. In an exampleembodiment the chest lock input device 104 is in supporting connectionwith a generally horizontally extending dividing wall 110 whichseparates the chest portion from the upper housing portion. Of coursethis housing structure is example of machine housing structures and inother embodiments other approaches may be used.

An authorized servicer who needs to gain access to an item, component ordevice of the machine located in the chest area may do so by opening thefascia lock and moving the first fascia portion 20 so that the area 102becomes accessible. Thereafter the authorized servicer may access andmanipulate the chest lock input device to receive one or more inputs,which if appropriate enables unlocking of the chest door 18. The chestdoor may thereafter be moved relative to the housing and about itshinges 106 to enable the servicer to gain access to items, devices orcomponents within the chest. These activities may include for exampleadding or removing currency, removing deposited items such as envelopesor checks, or repairing mechanisms or electrical devices that operate toenable the machine to accept deposited items or to dispense currency.When servicing activity within the chest is completed, the chest doormay be closed and the locking lever 108 moved so as to secure theboltwork holding the chest door in a closed position. Of course thisstructure and service method is example and in other embodiments otherapproaches may be used.

In an example embodiment the second fascia portion 22 is also movablerelative to the housing of the machine. In an example embodiment thesecond fascia portion 22 is movable in supporting connection with arollout tray 112 schematically shown in FIG. 3. The rollout tray isoperative to support components of the user interface thereon as well asthe second fascia portion. The rollout tray enables the second fasciaportion to move outward relative to the machine housing thereby exposingcomponents and transaction function devices supported on the tray andproviding access to a second portion 114 within the upper housing andpositioned behind the second fascia portion. Thus as can be appreciated,when the second fascia portion is moved outward, the components on thetray are disposed outside the housing of the machine so as to facilitateservicing, adjustment and/or replacement of such components. Furthercomponents which remain positioned within the housing of the machine asthe rollout tray is extended become accessible in the second portion asthe second fascia portion 22 is disposed outward and away from thehousing.

In an example embodiment the rollout tray 112 is in operative connectionwith a releasable locking device. The locking device is generallyoperative to hold the tray in a retracted position such that the secondfascia portion remains in an operative position adjacent to the upperhousing area as shown in FIGS. 1,2 and 3. This releasable lockingmechanism may comprise one or more forms of locking type devices. In anexample embodiment the releasable locking mechanism may be released bymanipulation of an actuator 116 which is accessible to an authorizeduser in the first portion 102 of the upper housing 14. As a result anauthorized servicer of the machine is enabled to move the second fasciaportion outward for servicing by first accessing portion 102 in themanner previously discussed. Thereafter by manipulating the actuator 116the second fascia portion is enabled to move outward as shown in phantomin FIG. 8 so as to facilitate servicing components on the rollout tray.Such components may include for example a printer or card reader. Altersuch servicing the second fascia portion may be moved toward the housingso as to close the second portion 114. Such movement in an exampleembodiment causes the rollout tray to be latched and held in theretracted position without further manipulation of the actuator.However, in other embodiments other types of locking mechanisms may beused to secure the rollout tray in the retracted position. It should beunderstood that this approach is example and in other embodiments otherapproaches may be used.

As best shown in FIG. 7 in which the components supported in the upperhousing are not shown, the delivery area 52 and the deposit acceptancearea 58 are in supporting connection with the chest door 18. As suchwhen the chest door 18 is opened, the delivery area 52 and the depositacceptance area 58 will move relative to the housing of the machine. Anexample embodiment shown facilitates servicing of the machine byproviding for the illumination for the transaction areas by illuminationsources positioned in supporting connection with the rollout tray 112.As best shown in FIG. 6, these illumination sources 118 are movable withthe rollout tray and illuminate in generally a downward direction. Inthe operative position of the second fascia portion 22 and the chestdoor 18, the illumination sources are generally aligned with apertures120 and 122 which extend through the top of a cover 124 which generallysurrounds the recessed pockets 60 and 56. As shown in FIG. 10 aperture120 is generally vertically aligned with window 68 and aperture 122 isgenerally aligned with window 70. In an example embodiment, apertures120 and 122 each have a translucent or transparent lens positionedtherein to minimize the risk of the introduction of dirt or othercontaminants into the interior of the cover 124.

As can be appreciated from FIGS. 6 and 8, when the chest door 18 isclosed and the second fascia portion 22 is moved to the operativeposition, the illumination sources 118 are positioned in generallyaligned relation with apertures 120 and 122. As a result theillumination of the illumination devices is operative to cause light tobe transmitted through the respective aperture and to illuminate thetransaction area within the corresponding recessed pocket.

In operation of an example embodiment, the controller executesprogrammed instructions so as to initiate illumination of eachtransaction area at appropriate times during the conduct oftransactions. For example in an example embodiment if the user isconducting a cash withdrawal transaction, the controller may initiateillumination of the delivery area 52 when the cash is delivered thereinand is available to be taken by a user. Such illumination draws theuser's attention to the need to remove the cash and will point out tothe user that the cash is ready to be taken. In an example embodimentthe controller is programmed so that when the user takes the cash themachine will move to the next transaction step. After the cash is sensedas taken, the controller may operate to cease illumination of thedelivery area 56. Of course these approaches are example.

Likewise in an example embodiment if a user of the machine indicatesthat they wish to conduct a deposit transaction, the controller maycause the machine to operate to initiate illumination of the depositacceptance area 58. The user's attention is drawn to the place wherethey must insert the deposit envelope in order to have it be accepted inthe machine. In an example embodiment the controller may operate to alsoilluminate the illumination panel 62 to illuminate the deposit envelopeproviding opening 48 so that the user is also made aware of the locationfrom which a deposit envelope may be provided. In an example embodimentthe controller may operate to cease illumination through the window 70and/or the illumination panel 62 after the deposit envelope is indicatedas being sensed within the machine.

In alternative embodiments other approaches may be taken. This mayinclude for example drawing the customer's attention to the particulartransaction area by changing the nature of the illumination in therecessed pocket to which the customer's attention is to be drawn. Thismay be done for example by changing the intensity of the light, flashingthe light, changing the color of the light or doing other actions whichmay draw a user's attention to the appropriate transaction area.Alternatively or in addition, a sound emitter, vibration, projectingpins or other indicator may be provided for visually impaired users soas to indicate to them the appropriate transaction area to which thecustomer's attention is to be drawn. Of course these approaches areexample and in other embodiments other approaches may be used.

As previously discussed an example embodiment of machine 10 is alsooperative to draw a user's attention at appropriate times to the cardreader slot 28. Machine 10 also includes features to minimize the riskof unauthorized interception of card data by persons who may attempt toinstall a fraud device such as an unauthorized card reading device onthe machine. As shown in FIG. 9, the example card slot 28 extendsthrough a card slot housing 66 which extends in generally surroundingrelation of the card slot. It should be understood that although thehousing 66 generally bounds the entire card slot, in other embodimentsthe principles described herein may be applied by bounding only one ormore sides of a card slot as may be appropriate for detectingunauthorized card reading devices. Further, it should be understood thatwhile an example embodiment is described in connection with a cardreader that accepts a card into the machine, the principles beingdescribed may be applied to types of card readers that do not accept acard into the machine, such as readers where a user draws the cardthrough a slot, inserts and removes a card manually from a slot, andother card reading structures.

In an example embodiment the housing 66 includes a plurality ofradiation emitting devices 126. The radiation emitting devices emitvisible radiation which can be perceived by a user of the machine.However, in other embodiments the radiation emitting devices may includedevices which emit invisible radiation such as infrared radiation, butwhich nonetheless can be used for sensing the presence of unauthorizedcard reading devices adjacent to the card slot, in an example embodimentthe controller operates to illuminate the radiation emitting devices 126at appropriate times during the transaction sequence. This may includefor example times during transactions when a user is prompted to inputthe card into the machine or alternatively when a user is prompted totake the card from the card slot 28. In various embodiments thecontroller may be programmed to provide solid illumination of theradiation emitting devices or may vary the intensity of the devices asappropriate to draw the user's attention to the card slot.

In an example embodiment the card slot housing 66 includes therein oneor more radiation sensing devices 128. The radiation sensing devices arepositioned to detect changes in at least one property of the radiationreflected from the emitting devices 126. The sensing devices 128 are inoperative connection with the controller. The controller is operativeresponsive to its programming to compare one or more valuescorresponding to the magnitude and/or other properties of radiationsensed by one or more of the sensors, to one or more stored values andto make a determination whether the comparison is such that there is aprobable unauthorized card reading device installed on the fascia of themachine. In some embodiments the controller may be operative to executefuzzy logic programming for purposes of determining whether the natureof the change in reflected radiation or other detected parameters aresuch that there has been an unauthorized device installed and whetherappropriate personnel should be notified.

FIG. 10 shows a side view of the housing 66. An example of a frauddevice which comprises unauthorized card reading device 130 is shownattached externally to the housing 66. The unauthorized card readingdevice includes a slot 132 generally aligned with slot 128. The device130 also includes a sensor shown schematically as 134 which is operativeto sense the encoded magnetic flux reversals which represent data on themagnetic stripe of a credit or debit card. As can be appreciated, anarrangement of the type shown in FIG. 10 enables the sensor 134 ifproperly aligned adjacent to the magnetic stripe of a card, to read thecard data as the card passes in and out of slot 128. Such anunauthorized reading device may be connected via radio frequency (RF) orthrough inconspicuous wiring to other devices which enable interceptionof the card data. In some situations criminals may also endeavor toobserve the input of the user's PIN corresponding to the card data so asto gain access to the account of the user.

As can be appreciated from FIG. 10 the installation of the unauthorizedcard reading device 130 changes the amount of radiation from emittingdevices 126 and that is reflected or otherwise transmitted to thesensors 128. Depending on the nature of the device and its structure,the amount or other properties of radiation may increase or decrease.However, a detectable change will often occur in the magnitude or otherproperties of sensed radiation between a present transaction and a priortransaction which was conducted prior to an unauthorized card readingdevice being installed. Of course the sensing of the magnitude ofradiation is but one example of a property of radiation that may besensed as having changed so as to indicate the presence of anunauthorized reading device.

FIG. 11 demonstrates an example simplified logic flow executed by acontroller for detecting the installation of an unauthorized cardreading device. It should be understood that this transaction logic ispart of the overall operation of the machine to carry out transactions.The example logic flow is carded out through the execution of softwareinstructions by at least one processor. The software instructions may beresident on any form of article which includes computer readableinstructions such as a hard disk, floppy disk, semiconductor memory,flash memory, CD, DVD, ROM or other article. In this example logic flowthe machine operates to carry out card reading transactions in a normalmanner and to additionally execute the represented steps as a part ofsuch logic each time a card is read. From an initial step 136 thecontroller in the machine is operative to sense that a card is in thereader within the machine in a step 138. Generally in thesecircumstances the controller will be operating the radiation emittingdevices 126 as the user has inserted their card and the card has beendrawn into the machine. In this example embodiment the controllercontinues to operate the radiation emitting devices and senses theradiation level or levels sensed by one or more sensors 128. This isdone in a step 140.

The controller is next operative to compare the signals corresponding tothe sensed radiation levels to one or more values in a step 142. Thiscomparison may be done a number of ways and may in some embodimentsexecute fuzzy logic so as to avoid giving false indications due toacceptable conditions such as a user having the user's finger adjacentto the card slot 28 during a portion of the transaction. In the case ofa user's finger for example, the computer may determine whether anunauthorized reading device is installed based on the nature, magnitudeand changes during a transaction in sensed radiation, along withappropriate programmed weighing factors. Of course various approachesmay be used within the scope of the concept discussed herein. However,based on the one or more comparisons in step 142 the controller isoperative to make a decision at step 144 as to whether the sensedvalue(s) compared to stored value(s) compared in step 142 have adifference that is in excess of one or more thresholds which suggestthat an unauthorized card reading device has been installed.

If the comparison does not indicate a result that exceeds thethreshold(s) the transaction devices are run as normal as represented ina step 146. For example, a customer may be prompted to input a PIN, andif the card data and PIN are valid, the customer may be authorized toconduct a cash dispensing transaction through operation of the machine.Further, in an example embodiment the controller may operate to adjustthe stored values to some degree based on the more recent readings. Thismay be appropriate in order to compensate for the effects of dirt on thefascia or loss of intensity of the emitting devices or other factors.This is represented in a step 148. In step 148 the controller operatesthe machine to conduct transaction steps in the usual manner asrepresented in a step 150.

If in step 144 the difference between the sensed and stored valuesexceeds the threshold(s), then this is indicative that an unauthorizedcard reading device may have been installed since the last transaction.In an example embodiment when this occurs, the controller is operativeto present a warning screen to the user as represented in a step 152.This warning screen may be operative to advise the user that anunauthorized object has been sensed adjacent to the card reader slot.This may warn a user for example that a problem is occurring.Alternatively if a user has inadvertently placed innocently some objectadjacent to the card reader slot, then the user may withdraw ft. Inaddition or in the alternative, further logic steps may be executed suchas the machine prompting a user to indicate whether or not they can seethe radiation emitting devices being illuminated adjacent to the cardslot and prompting the user to provide an input to indicate if suchitems are visible. Additionally or in the alternative, the illuminatingdevices within the housing 66 may be operative to cause the emittingdevices to output words or other symbols which a user can indicate thatthey can see or cannot see based on inputs provided as prompts fromoutput devices of the machine. In some alternative embodiments, sensorsor cameras may be utilized to observe the outputs through the fascia,and are connected to processors including suitable programming todetermine if particular outputs are not sensed or perceivable. Theabsence of the ability to perceive such signals may be indicative of theinstallation of an unauthorized interception device. This may enable themachine to determine whether an unauthorized reading device has beeninstalled or whether the sensed condition is due to other factors. Itmay also cause a user to note the existence of the reading device andremove ft. Of course various approaches could be taken depending on theprogramming of the machine.

If an unauthorized reading device has been detected, the controller inan example embodiment will also execute a step 154 in which a statusmessage is sent to an appropriate service provider or other entity toindicate the suspected problem. This may be done for example through useof a system like that shown in U.S. Pat. No. 5,984,178 the disclosure ofwhich is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. Alternativelymessages may be sent to system addresses in a manner like that shown inU.S. Pat. No. 6,289,320 the disclosure of which is also incorporatedherein by reference in its entirety. In a step 156 the controller willalso operate to record data identifying for the particular transactionin which there has been suspected interception of the card holder's carddata. In addition or in the alternative, a message may be sent to thebank or other institution alerting them to watch for activity in theuser's card account for purposes of detecting whether unauthorized useis occurring. Alternatively or in addition, some embodiments may includecard readers that change, add, or write data to a user's card in casesof suspected interception. Such changed data may be tracked or otherwiseused to assure that only a card with the modified data is useablethereafter. Alternatively or in addition, in some embodiments themodified card may be moved in translated relation, moved irregularly, orotherwise handled to reduce the risk that modified data is interceptedas the card is output from the machine.

In other example embodiments, card readers may be provided which includefeatures for reading a card inserted in a direction that is generallytransverse to the direction of the extending magnetic stripe of thecard. That is, instead of inserting a short edge of a card into a cardinput slot, a long edge of the card can be inserted first into the cardslot. The card slot is wider than a typical slot, and the card readerread head is horizontally movable. This may be done in a mannerdescribed in U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. Nos. 61/446,744filed Feb. 25, 2011 and 61/574,594 filed Aug. 5, 2011, the disclosuresof each of which are herein incorporated by reference in their entirety.Of course these approaches are example of many that may be employed.

In an example embodiment the machine is operated to conduct atransaction even in cases where it is suspected that an unauthorizedcard reading device has been installed. This is represented in a step158. However, in other embodiments other approaches may be taken such asrefusing to conduct the transaction. Other steps may also be taken suchas capturing the user's card and advising the user that a new one willbe issued. This approach may be used to minimize the risk thatunauthorized transactions will be conducted with the card data as thecard can be promptly invalidated. Of course other approaches may betaken depending on the programming of the machine and the desires of thesystem operator. In addition while the fraud device shown is anunauthorized card reading device, the principles described may also beused to detect other types of fraud devices such as for example falsefascias, user interface covers and other devices.

In some embodiments additional or alternative features and methods maybe employed to help detect the presence of unauthorized card readingdevices or other attempted fraud devices in connection with the machine.For example in some embodiments an oscillation sensor may be attached tothe machine to detect changes in frequency or vibration that result fromthe installation of unauthorized devices on the machine. FIG. 10 showsschematically an oscillator 127 attached to the interior surface of themachine fascia. Oscillator 127 may be operative responsive to thecontroller and suitable vibration circuitry to impart vibratory motionto the fascia in the vicinity of the card reader slot. A sensor 129 isin operative connection with the fascia and is operative to sense atleast one parameter of the motion imparted to the fascia by theoscillator 127. Although oscillator 127 and sensor 129 are shown asseparate components, it should be understood that in some embodimentsthe functions of the components may be performed by a single device.

The sensor 129 is in operative connection with the controller of themachine through appropriate circuitry. The controller selectivelyactivates the oscillator and the sensor 129 is operative to sense theresulting movement of the fascia caused by the oscillation. Theinstallation of an unauthorized card reading device or other frauddevice on the machine will generally result in a change in at least oneproperty being sensed by the sensor 129. This may include changes inamplitude, frequency or both. Alternatively or in addition, someembodiments may provide for the oscillator to impart vibrationcharacteristics of various types or vibratory motion through a range offrequencies and/or amplitudes. Sensed values for various oscillatorydriving outputs may then be compared through operation of the controllerto one or more previously stored values. Variances from prior values maybe detected or analyzed through operation of the controller andnotifications given in situations where a change has occurred whichsuggests the installation of an unauthorized device.

In some embodiments the controller may cause the oscillator and sensorto operate periodically to sense for installation of a possibleunauthorized device. Alternatively, the controller may cause such acheck to be made during each transaction. Alternatively in someembodiments oscillation testing may be conducted when a possibleunauthorized device is detected by sensing radiation properties. Thecontroller may operate to take various actions in response to sensing apossible unauthorized reading device through vibration, radiation orboth. For example detecting a possible fraud device by both radiationand oscillation may warrant taking different actions than only detectinga possible fraud device through only one test or condition.

In some embodiments the controller may be programmed to adjust thethresholds or other limits used for resolving the presence of a possiblefraud device for responses to changes that occur over time at themachine. This may include for example adjusting the thresholds forindicating possible fraud conditions based on the aging of theoscillator or the sensor. Such adjustments may also be based onparameters sensed by other sensors which effect vibration properties.These may include for example, the fascia temperature, air temperature,relative humidity and other properties. Of course readings from theseand other sensors may be used to adjust thresholds of the oscillationsensor, radiation sensor or other fraud device sensors. Variousapproaches may be taken depending on the particular system.

In some embodiments the oscillator may additionally or alternatively beused to prevent the unauthorized reading of card reader signals. Thismay be done for example when the banking machine has a device whichtakes a user card into the machine for purposes of reading data on thecard. In such embodiments the controller may operate to vibrate the areaof the fascia adjacent to the card reader slot when a user's card ismoving into and/or out of the slot. In such cases the vibration may beoperative to cause the generation of noise or inaccurate reading by anunauthorized card reading sensor so as to make it more difficult tointercept the card stripe data using an unauthorized reading device. Insome embodiments such vibration may also serve to disclose or make moreapparent the presence of unauthorized card reading devices. Of coursethese approaches are example and in other embodiments other approachesmay be used.

In some example embodiments provision may be made for detecting thepresence of unauthorized input sensing devices for sensing a user'sinputs through the keypad on the machine. Such unauthorized inputsensing devices may be used by criminals to sense the PIN input by theuser. Detecting unauthorized devices may be accomplished by providingappropriate sensing devices in or adjacent to the keypad. Such sensingdevices may be operative to detect that a structure has been placed overor adjacent to the keypad. Such sensors may be in operative connectionwith the controller in the machine or other devices which are operativeto determine the probable installation of such an unauthorized inputsensing device. In response to determining the probable installation ofsuch a device, the controller may be operative in accordance with itsprogramming to provide notification to appropriate entities, modify theoperation of the machine such as to disable operation or prevent certainoperations, or to take other appropriate actions.

FIG. 12 shows the cross-sectional view of example keypad 32. Keypad 32is shown schematically, and it should be understood that not all of thecomponents of the keypad are represented. Keypad 32 includes a pluralityof keys 250. Keys 250 are moveable responsive to pressure applied by auser's finger to provide an input corresponding to alphabetical ornumerical characters. Extending between some of the keys 250 are areasor spaces 252. Extending in spaces 252 are sensors 254. In an exampleembodiment the sensors 254 are radiation type sensors, but as previouslydiscussed, in other embodiments other approaches may be used. Overlyingthe sensors 254 is an outer layer 256. In an example embodiment, layer256 is translucent or otherwise comprised of material so as to partiallyenable the transmission of radiation from the sensors therethrough.

As represented in FIG. 13, the example sensors 254 include a radiationemitter 258 and a radiation receiver 260. During operation the radiationemitter is operative to output radiation that is at least partiallyreflected from the inner surface of layer 256. The reflected radiationis received by the receiver 260. Corresponding electrical signals areproduced by the receiver, and such signals are transmitted throughappropriate circuitry so as to enable the controller to detect thechanges in signals that correspond to probable presence of anunauthorized reading device.

FIG. 14 is a schematic view of an unauthorized input intercepting device262 that has been positioned in overlying relation of a keypad 32. Theinput intercepting device 262 includes false keys 264 which are moveableand which are operatively connected to the corresponding keys 250 of thekeypad. In an example embodiment, input intercepting device 262 includessensors which are operative to detect which of the false keys 264 havebeen depressed by a user. Because the depression of the false keys isoperative to actuate the actual keys 250, the machine is enabled tooperate with the device 262 in place. Input intercepting device 262 inexample embodiments may include a wireless transmitter or other suitabledevice for transmitting the input signals to a criminal who mayintercept such inputs.

As represented in FIG. 19, the input intercepting device 262 includesportions 267 which extend in the areas 252 in overlying relation oflayer 256. As represented in FIG. 15, the portion of the inputintercepting device extending in overlying relation of the layer 256 isoperative to cause a change in the amount of radiation from the emitter258 that is reflected and sensed by the receiver 260 of the sensor. Thisis because the overlying portion will have different radiationreflecting or absorbing characteristics which will change the radiationreflective properties of the layer 256 compared to when no such inputintercepting device is present. Thus the installation of theunauthorized input intercepting device can be detected.

In some example embodiments the controller may be operative to sense thelevel of reflected radiation at the sensors periodically. This may bedone, for example, between transactions when a user is not operating theterminal. This may avoid giving a false indication that an unauthorizedinput intercepting device has been installed when a user is resting ahand or some other item adjacent to the keypad during a transaction. Ofcourse in other embodiments sensor readings can be taken and comparedduring transactions to prior values stored in a data store to determineif a change lasting longer than normal has occurred which suggests thatan unauthorized input intercepting device has been installed rather thana user has temporarily placed their hand or some other item adjacent tothe keypad. For example, in some example embodiments the controller maynot resolve that there is a probable unauthorized input interceptingdevice on the machine until a significant change from a prior conditionis detected in the radiation properties adjacent to the keypad onseveral occasions both during a transaction and thereafter.Alternatively or in addition, a controller may be operative to determinethat an improper device has been installed as a result of changes thatoccur during a time when no transactions have occurred. Alternatively inother embodiments, the controller may operate to sense and analyzesignals from the sensors responsive to detecting inputs from othersensors, such as for example an ultrasonic sensor which senses that aperson has moved adjacent to the machine but has not operated themachine to conduct a transaction. Of course these approaches are merelyexample of many approaches that may be used.

It should be understood that although in an example embodiment radiationtype sensors are used for purposes of detection, in other embodimentsother types of sensors may be used. These include, for example,inductance sensors, sonic sensors, RF sensors, or other types of sensingapproaches that can be used to detect the presence of material inlocations that suggest an unauthorized input intercepting device beingpositioned adjacent to the keypad. Further, in some embodiments thecontroller or other circuitry associated with the sensors may beoperative to make adjustments for normal changes that may occur at themachine. These may include, for example, changes with time due to agingof emitters, the build up of dirt in the area adjacent to the keypad,weather conditions, moisture conditions, scratching of the surface ofthe sensing layer, or other conditions which may normally occur.Appropriate programs may be executed by the controller or othercircuitry so as to recalibrate and/or compensate for such conditions asmay occur over time while still enabling the detection of a rapid changewhich is sufficiently significant and of such duration so as to indicatethe probable installation of an unauthorized input intercepting device.Of course these approaches are example of many approaches that may beused.

In other embodiments other or additional approaches to detectingfraudulent reading or other improper activities may be used. Forexample, in some embodiments the fascia of the banking machine may besubject to observation within a field of view of one or more imagingdevices such as camera 131 schematically represented in FIG. 10. Camera15 may be in operative connection with an image capture system of thetype shown in U.S. Pat. No. 6,583,813, the disclosure of which isincorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

In some embodiments the controller and/or an image capture system may beoperative to execute sequences of activities responsive to triggeringevents that may be associated with attempts to install or operate frauddevices. For example, the presence of a person in front of the bankingmachine may be sensed through image analysis, weight sensors, sonicdetectors or other detectors. The person remaining in proximity to themachine for a selected period or remaining too long after a transactionmay constitute a triggering event which is operative to cause the systemto take actions in a programmed sequence. Such actions may includecapturing images from one or more additional cameras and/or moving imagedata from one or more cameras from temporary to more permanent storage.The sequence may also include capturing image data from the fascia totry to detect tampering or improper devices. Radiation or vibrationtests may also be conducted as part of a sequence. Notifications and/orimages may also be sent to certain entities or system addresses. Ofcourse these actions are example.

In some example embodiments the controller of the machine or otherconnected computers may be operatively programmed to analyze conditionsthat are sensed and to determine based on the sensed conditions that afraud device is installed. Such a programmed computer may be operativeto apply certain rules such as to correlate the repeated sensing ofabnormal conditions with a possible fraud or tampering condition and toconduct tests for the presence of fraud devices. Such events mayconstitute soft triggers for sequences or other actions to detect andreduce the risk of fraud devices. Of course these approaches are merelyexample and in other embodiments other approaches may be used.

In some embodiments the machine may include sensors adapted to interceptsignals from unauthorized card readers or customer input interceptingdevices. For example, some fraud devices may operate to transmit RFsignals to a nearby receiver operated by a criminal. The presence ofsuch RF signals in proximity to the machine may be indicative of theinstallation of such a device. Such signals may be detected byappropriate circuitry and analyzed through operation of the machinecontroller or other processor, and if it is determined that it isprobable that such a device is installed, programmed actions may betaken.

For example, in some embodiments suitable RF shielding material may beapplied to or in the fascia to reduce the level of RF interference fromdevices within the machine at the exterior of the fascia. Antennas orother appropriate radiation sensing devices may be positioned adjacentto or installed on the fascia. A change in RF radiation in the vicinityof the fascia exterior may result upon the installation of anunauthorized device. The RF signals can be detected by receivercircuitry, and signals or data corresponding thereto input to aprocessor. In some embodiments the circuitry may also determine thefrequency of the radiation sensed to be used in resolving if it iswithin the range emitted by legitimate devices such as cell phones ofusers operating the machine. In other embodiments the circuitry mayanalyze the signals to determine if they are varying, and the circuitryand/or the processor may evaluate whether the changes in signalcorrespond to the input of a PIN or a card to the machine.

In response to the sensed signal data, the processor may operate inaccordance with its programming to evaluate the nature and character ofthe intercepted signals. For example, if the signals do not correspondto a legitimate source, such as a cell phone, the processor may operateto take actions such as to wholly or partially cease operation of themachine, capture images with a camera and digital video recorder, and/ornotify an appropriate remote entity through operation of the machine.Alternatively, the processor may compare the sensed RF signals totransaction activity at the machine. If the sensed signals aredetermined to be varying in ways that correspond in a pattern orrelationship to card or PIN inputs, for example, the processor mayoperate in accordance with its programming to cause the machine or otherdevices to take appropriate programmed steps.

In still other example embodiments the processor may be in operativeconnection with a RF emitter. The processor may operate in accordancewith its programming to cause the emitter to generate RF signals thatinterfere with the detected signals. This can be done on a continuingbasis or alternatively only at times during user operation of themachine when user inputs are likely to be intercepted. For example, theprocessor controlling the emitter may operate the machine or be incommunication with a controller thereof. In such situations, theprocessor may operate to control the emitter to produce outputs at timeswhen a user's card is moving into or out of a card slot, and/or when themachine is accepting a user's PIN or other inputs. Thus, the emitter maybe operative to produce interfering signals during relatively briefperiods so as to not disrupt RF transmissions for an extended period inthe event an incorrect determination is made and the RF signals are froma legitimate source.

In some embodiments an emitter may be a type that transmits on aplurality of frequencies intended to disrupt transmissions within theexpected range of frequencies for a fraud device. In other embodimentsthe emitter may be controlled responsive to the processor to match thefrequency or frequencies of suspect signals that have been detected. Ofcourse these approaches are example of approaches that may be used.

In alternative example embodiments, the radiation may be generated so asto disrupt sensors that may attempt the reading of a magnetic stripe ofa card as it passes through a card reader slot. This may beaccomplished, for example, through the use of a suitable electrical coilor other device which produces electromagnetic radiation in the areaadjacent to the exterior of the card slot where a skimming device wouldlikely be located. Suitable driving circuitry may operate to produceradiation in the form of electromagnetic pulses which will be sensed assignals by a read head of the skimming device. Driving circuitry mayoperate to cause such electromagnetic radiation to be produced by atoroid or similar structure adjacent to the slot. In some exampleembodiments, the toroid may surround the card slot on the inside of themachine fascia and be configured so that the electromagnetic radiationis generally directed toward an area outside of the machine and adjacentto the slot. Further in example embodiments, suitable shielding materialmay be provided to further assure that the radiation acts in the areawhere a skimmer may be positioned and does not interfere with theoperation of other devices in or on the machine. FIG. 41 shows anexample of a card reader bezel 660. Upper radiation emitters 664 arelocated adjacent to an upper portion of the card reader entry slot 662of the bezel. Lower radiation emitters 666 are located adjacent to alower portion of the slot 662.

In example embodiments, the strength of the radiation may be limited toa level that does not damage the data recorded within the magneticstripe of a card. For magnetic cards used in financial applications,generally the high coercivity stripe media will not be adverselyimpacted provided that the electromagnetic pulse that is produced is ator below 4,000 Gauss. Of course it should be understood that in otherapplications and particularly when other card types are used, differentapproaches may be taken.

In example systems suitable driving circuitry may operate to causeradiation to be output from the toroid or other emitter at a frequencythat will generally interfere with the signals that an unauthorizedreading head would generate when sensing the magnetic stripe on a card.Such frequency will generally be of sufficiently high strength and at afrequency so as to produce so much noise in the signal from theunauthorized reader head that the information encoded on the magneticstripe of the card cannot be determined from the signals. Alternativelyor in addition, the driving circuitry may operate so as to vary thepulse frequency and duration in a random or otherwise programmed mannerso as to further attempt to interfere with the signals that would begenerated by an unauthorized stripe reading device. Such signals may bevaried, for example, in response to variations in speed and/or directionof the card as it is moved through the reader slot of the fascia. Thus,for example, in a system that varies the speed and/or direction of thecard, a suitable processor programmed to receive signals indicative ofthe operation of card reader motors or other moving devices, may operateto vary the interference radiation that is output so as to try toachieve the maximum interference to prevent the unauthorizedinterception of card data.

The pulse frequency of interfering electromagnetic radiation which isintentionally output can be varied in a predetermined programmedpattern. The at least one processor of the machine, by knowing thepattern, can cause the card reader to read the stripe data when theinterfering noise is not being emitted. Alternatively, the at least oneprocessor can resolve the actual magnetic stripe data from the totaldata read by the card reader. For example, the at least one processorcan act to remove the data attributed to the generated noise from thetotal read data.

Further, in some example embodiments, the output of electromagneticradiation can be operative to cause the inducement of changes to dataencoded on counterfeit cards which may have magnetic stripe materialsthat are more readily modified than genuine cards. Thus, for example, insome embodiments the circuitry associated with the card reader mayoperate to determine if the data read from the card varies in ways thatsuggest that the radiation output has modified data written on the card.Thus, for example, the effect of the electromagnetic noise from thetoroid or other emitter may have resulted in the recording of such noiseon the stripe of a counterfeit card. Such noise may have impacted therecorded data on the card such that the magnetic flux reversals whichcorrespond to the card data are substantially reduced or evensubstantially erased. Further, an area of a counterfeit card which havebeen exposed to the radiation for a longer period of time may have thelevel of noise included in the stripe increased for those areas havingsuch extended exposure. Thus, for example, the last portion of the cardto enter the card reader may exhibit the effects of more exposure tonoise on the data encoded on the stripe. Thus through analyzing thesignals that are received from the magnetic read head within the cardreader, a low quality counterfeit card that has had its magneticproperties modified through operation of the anti-skim device can bedetected. Thus for example in some embodiments, the signals from theread heads of the machine card reader, including, for example, noiselevels, the magnitude of the flux reversals, and other properties, maybe analyzed for areas along the length of the stripe through operationof at least one processor to identify conditions which correspond to acounterfeit card, in response to detecting signals which suggest thatthe card may be counterfeit, the at least one processor may operate inaccordance with its programming to not cause the requested transactionto be conducted. This may include, for example, not processing thetransaction, capturing the card, or taking other appropriate steps.

Further in some alternative embodiments, the detection of one or moreconditions that correspond to a suspect counterfeit card may cause theat least one processor to operate the machine to operate the card readerto cause the card to be passed back out through the slot at least somedistance so that it is exposed again to the radiation. The card can thenbe returned into the machine and read by the card reader so the effectsof this additional exposure can be analyzed. The changes in the signalsread from the card may further confirm that the card is a counterfeit.Of course these approaches are example and in other embodiments, otherapproaches may be used.

As can be seen, an example embodiment employs electromagnetic radiationto jam skimmers. An example system can cause electromagnetic radiationto be output (directed) into the area of the card slot when a card is(expected to be) moving into or out of the machine. This electromagneticradiation output can prevent a skimming device, which has beenfraudulently attached to the outside of a machine at a position adjacentto the card input slot, from being able to read data that is encoded onthe magnetic stripe of a card.

As previously discussed, an example embodiments also allow formodification of a counterfeit card's stripe data by outputtingelectromagnetic radiation. A counterfeit card may be made usingmaterials that are not as high quality as regular (genuine) cards. As aresult, the magnetic stripe used on a card that is readily programmableby counterfeiters may be subject to having its encoded data changed byvirtue of the outputted electromagnetic radiation designed to jam thesignals from a counterfeit read head.

As previously described, the output of electromagnetic radiation by amachine can be viewed as providing “noise”. This noise can begin tochange or reduce the signal strength that can be detected from acounterfeit card. If the radiation exposure is long enough then it mayeven serve to effectively erase data that was encoded on the counterfeitcard's magnetic stripe. By analyzing the magnetic flux reversals thatcan be read from the card, and by determining that the signals producedby the read head from flux data has been reduced or modified as a resultof exposure to the noise, a counterfeit card can be identified. Inaddition, if a suspect card is identified, the card reader can operateto send the card back out of the card slot part way, so that it isfurther exposed to the damaging electromagnetic radiation. The card canthen be pulled back into the machine and reviewed again to see if thefurther (additional) exposure to the electromagnetic radiation hasfurther effectively impacted the data on the card's magnetic stripe. Byeffectively determining that the encoded data on the magnetic stripe wasreadily modified by outputted electromagnetic radiation that wasintended to jam a card skimmer, the low (poor) quality of the magneticstripe on a card can identify it as a potentially counterfeit card.

The same electromagnetic radiation output by a machine can serve several(e.g., at least three) fraud prevention functions. First, theelectromagnetic radiation can function to jam operation of a fraudulentcard reader device. Second, this same electromagnetic radiation canfunction to modify data on a counterfeit card's (low quality) magneticstripe, enabling the machine to detect the counterfeit card. Third,because the counterfeit card's magnetic stripe data was damaged(modified) by the radiation, the physically (structurally) damaged cardcan be prevented from future successful use. That is, not only can themachine deny acceptance of the card for the currently attemptedtransaction, but the machine can also cause the card to be denied use infuture transactions attempted at other machines. Thus, the examplearrangement provides for prevention of future fraud.

In still other example embodiments, the automated banking machine caninclude an image capture device such as a small camera or similarsensors adjacent to the card slot. Such a camera can operate to captureimages of the front and/or back of the card as the card passes throughthe card slot. Alternatively, such a camera or other sensor devicesuitable for capturing images on the cards may be positioned inside themachine or within the card reader itself. The image capture device canoperate to capture visible images of the front and/or back of the cardthat is being and/or has been received by the machine. FIG. 41 alsoshows an example of cameras 668 located adjacent the card entry slot662. Another camera 670 is located in at least part of a projectionmember 672 that extends outwardly from the face of the bezel 660.

The camera or other suitable image capture device can be in operativeconnection with one or more processors which operate to produce datacorresponding to images captured through operation of the image capturedevice. Such images will correspond to the visible appearance of theface of the card toward which the camera is directed. The image datacaptured can be analyzed through the operation of at least one processorfor the presence of one or more features which identify the particularcard as a genuine card. Such features can include, for example,alphanumeric characters corresponding to the name of the person to whichthe card is issued and/or the card (account) number. Such features canalso correspond to the presence of certain words, logos, or trademarks.Such features can also relate to the specific locations of image dataand/or text data that is normally present on a genuine card but islikely not to be present on a counterfeit card. Such image data and/ortext data may correspond to logos, holograms, trademarks, symbols, text,patterns, colors, bar codes, or other information.

In example embodiments image data can be compared to magnetic stripedata to determine if there is substantial correspondence (e.g., anacceptable amount of data matches). For example, the at least oneprocessor can operate character recognition software which is operativeto identify letters, numbers, symbols, or other items that are found incaptured images that correspond to the face (or a portion thereof) of acard. Such character recognition software is available from commercialsources such as A2ia and Carreker.

For example, the at least one processor can be programmed to identifythe letters included in the name of the individual that is on the cardface. The at least one processor can then operate to compare the lettersof the individual's name on the card face with data encoded on thecard's magnetic stripe which corresponds to the user's name. The atleast one processor can also operate to have the name data resolved fromother stripe data, such as from an account number that is correlated ina data store with the name data. The magnetic stripe data can be readthrough operation of a card reader.

In some embodiments certain types of genuine cards can include embossed(e.g., raised) numeric data. The at least one processor can operate todetermine if a card has embossed numeric data. If so, then the at leastone processor can further operate to determine if the embossed numericdata includes an account number which corresponds to the account numberdata encoded on the magnetic stripe. A failure to have data of eithertype (e.g., raised, account number on face, account number on stripe)correspond may indicate that the card is not genuine.

In alternative embodiments, the at least one processor can operate toanalyze the image data to detect the presence of certain symbols such asbank logos, card network logos, holograms, or other visuallyidentifiable items. The absence of such items (or the presence of itemsthat are not appropriate for the particular circumstances) may cause theat least one processor to operate in accordance with its programming toidentify the card as suspect counterfeit.

An example embodiments also provide for situations where counterfeitcards are (visually) blank cards or substantially blank. For example, aface of a card may only be of a single constant color (e.g., white). Theat least one processor can operate in accordance with its programming toidentify that images captured from a card contain little or no visibleindicia (or differences in color). The existence of such conditions maycause the card to be identified as a suspect counterfeit card. Inresponse to making such a determination, example embodiments of one ormore processors can operate in accordance with their associatedprogramming to prevent the carrying out of a transaction using the card.Further, the card may be captured, images of the particular user may becaptured and identified through the use of external cameras or otherdevices, notifications may be given remotely to bank employees or lawenforcement authorities, operation of the machine may be suspended orother appropriate steps taken depending on the programming associatedwith the particular machine.

As can be seen, an example embodiments allow for the use of visualreading of card data to detect a counterfeit card. An example embodimentenables the detection of counterfeit cards which have a magnetic stripebut little or no other data printed thereon. This includes detection ofa card that was originally produced for one purpose, but a criminalerased the card's image data and encoded different data onto the card'smagnetic stripe.

As previously discussed, one way of identifying a counterfeit card is tocapture an image of the front and/or back of the card, and then comparedata included in the captured image to data read from the card'smagnetic stripe. For example, an account number embossed on the front ofa card can be resolved from an image captured by a small camera. Thecamera can be s positioned on the inside the machine adjacent to thecard slot or positioned within the card reader. At least one processorcan analyze the image data, and determine if the account number dataread visually from the card corresponds to the account number data readfrom the magnetic stripe by the magnetic read head. If the accountnumbers do not substantially correspond (or no visually perceivableaccount number can be determined), then the card can be determined ascounterfeit.

As previously discussed, another way of identifying a counterfeit cardis to look for the name of the card holder. The name is normally visiblyembossed on the exterior surface of the card. The name is also normallymagnetically recorded on the card at magnetic stripe track 1. Bycomparing the name data from different locations and/or data formats (orby finding that the card's visual appearance does not include such namedata), a counterfeit card can be identified.

As previously discussed, a further way of identifying a counterfeit cardis to do a visual analysis for logos, holograms, or other data thatwould normally be present on a genuine card. This might include, forexample, looking for the presence of a Visa or MasterCard logo. It mightalso include looking for a hologram in an appropriate place (e.g., aspecific expected location on a card face). Such analysis can alsoinvolve searching for the name of a particular bank on the card face,and determining whether the name of the bank (on the card face)corresponds with the bank account data that can be read from themagnetic stripe. Similar comparable data features may also be resolvedfrom using the back side of the card. Also, correspondence between dataon the front and the back of the card as read visually can also help toidentify counterfeit cards. An alternative or additional approachincludes visually reading (or otherwise sensing) whether a card has many(or any) visible markings on it at all. A visible marking can involvecolors, scratches, etc. For example, determination of a totally whitecard can be equated as an indication that the card is counterfeit. Acard having no (or a very small amount of) scratches can also beassociated with a counterfeit card, or be an indication that additionalscrutiny should be undertaken. As previously discussed, all of theseapproaches can be implemented through appropriate programming of atleast one processor associated with the machine (e.g., a computer withinthe machine and/or a computer in operative connection with the machine)to analyze the visual data that can be read from a card. Furthermore, itshould be understood that the various methods described herein fordetermining whether a card is genuine or counterfeit can be used incombination with each other.

It should be understood that an example embodiments allow for use ofcard data that is stored in data storage formats other than a magneticstripe. Such card data storage formats can include (but are not limitedto) smart card chip features, radio frequency identification (RFID)tags, near field communication (NFC) chips, infrared (IR), wireless typecards, wireless communication, bar codes, electronic ink, etc. Forexample, specific image data (e.g., a name, account number, etc.) readfrom a face of a card can be compared to similar data (e.g., a name,account number, etc.) read from a RFD tag (or bar code, NFC chip, etc.)of the same card.

An alternate example embodiment is described with particular referenceto FIGS. 16 and 17. In an example embodiment, card reader 26, also shownschematically in FIG. 3, includes a card reader slot 28 defining apredetermined opening as indicated by arrow 300. The card readerincludes component 310, such as a magnetic read head, operative to readdata included on the magnetic stripe of a card such as a debit or creditcard. The embodiment shown in FIG. 16 is merely example, and it shouldbe understood that the principles described herein are applicable tocard readers that accept a card into the machine and to card readersthat do not accept a card into the machine.

At least one sensing device also referred to as a sensor, schematicallyindicated 312, is positioned within an interior of the machine adjacentthe card slot 28. In one example embodiment, the sensing device 312 isable to sense at least one property of radiation passing through thecard reader slot 28 to the interior of the machine and reaching thesensing device. For example, the sensing device 312 may be positioned soas to sense the intensity of ambient light that enters the slot fromoutside the machine housing, as indicated by arrows 316. Of course itshould be understood that the positioning of the sensing device isschematic only and in some embodiments the sensing device may comprisemultiple sensing devices and may be located outside the card path.Alternatively, one or more radiation sensors may be mounted on a movingmember that moves into the card path when a card is not present.

As represented in FIG. 17, in the event that an unauthorized cardreading device 320 is positioned adjacent the card reader 26, theproperty sensed by the sensing device 312 will be altered. For example,a sensing device enabled to sense the intensity of ambient lightentering the slot will detect a change in that property.

The unauthorized card reading device 320 may be positioned such that atleast a portion of the unauthorized device extends in the slot 28 whicheffectively narrows the opening defined by the card reader slot 28, asillustrated by arrow 324. In the illustrated embodiment, theunauthorized card reading device 320 includes a fraudulent magnetic readhead 326 used to skim data from a passing card stripe. The unauthorizedcard reading device 320 defines a narrower opening than the legitimatecard slot 28 to cause the inserted card to be kept close to thefraudulent magnetic read head 326.

The narrowed opening reduces the amount of ambient light entering theslot 28, and ultimately the amount of light that passes through the slotand is detected by sensing device 312. The decrease in intensity ofambient light detectable by the sensing device is illustrated in FIGS.16 and 17 by arrows 328, 330, respectively. In an example embodiment,the sensing device 312 includes at least one photocell which is used tosense light as an integrator over area. The example sensor configurationis generally not sensitive to dust due to its position within themachine interior. Of course, in other embodiments other approaches maybe used.

In other embodiments an unauthorized card reading device may notnecessarily have a narrower slot than the machine's card reader slot.However the placement of the unauthorized card reading device will oftenresult in a greater distance between the card opening to theunauthorized device outside the machine, and the at least one sensorinside the banking machine housing. This increased distance of theoverall card slot, and longer light path results in the amount of lightreaching the at least one sensor being reduced. Such a reduction inambient light or other radiation can be monitored and sensed betweentransactions or at other times to detect when such a device isinstalled, for example. Of course, these approaches are example.

In an alternate embodiment, illustrated in FIG. 18, the property sensedby the sensing device 312 may be intensity of radiation emitted by oneor more radiation emitters 334, such as LEDs, which are positioned toenable radiation emitted thereby to enter the slot 28 and be detected bysensing device 312. As will be readily appreciated, placement of anunauthorized card reading device adjacent the card reader impacts thedetectable radiation.

The one or more radiation emitters 334 may operate substantiallycontinuously, intermittently, or in accordance with transactioninstructions as previously described. For example, the radiationemitters 334 may emit radiation responsive to operation of at least onecontroller in the machine when a user is instructed by the machine toinsert a card into the card reader. The radiation is sensed by thesensing device. If an unauthorized card reading device has beenpositioned adjacent the card reader slot subsequent to a priortransaction, there is a detectable change in the property sensed by thesensing device. Further, in some embodiments a radiation guide, such asa fiber optic strand may extend from an area adjacent at least oneemitter to an area adjacent the detector. Having the outside end of thestrand located in the area where an unauthorized device would beattached may result in a greater change in sensed radiation to indicatethe installation of an unauthorized card reading device. Of course thisapproach is example.

In an example embodiment, the sensing device 312 is in operativeconnection with at least one controller in the machine, as in previouslydescribed embodiments. With reference again to FIG. 11, the controlleris operative responsive to its programming to compare one or more valuescorresponding to the sensed property to one or more stored values andmake a determination as to the probability that an unauthorized cardreading device 320 has been installed on the machine. Numerous factorsand conditions may be used in making the determination. If anunauthorized card reading device is likely present, the controllergenerates at least one signal or otherwise enables the machine to takeat least one action responsive to a change in the sensed property, aspreviously described. In an example embodiment, the responsive actionmay include the activation of an oscillator 127, as shown in FIG. 10 andpreviously described. Alternatively, the controller may sense for anunauthorized source of Radio Frequency (RF) signals at the machine. Ofcourse this is merely example.

In still other embodiments the automated banking machine may include atleast one light operated externally, such as a fascia light. The fascialight may provide a light level that is used to calculate a threshold ofminimum light that can be expected to pass through the card slot when nocard is present in the slot. The threshold can be used by the at leastone controller to determine if the amount of radiation reaching thesensor is below the threshold. In such circumstances the at least onecontroller may be operative in accordance with its programming togenerate at least the signal which can be used to indicate the likelypresence of an unauthorized card reading device.

Of course in some embodiments the programming of the at least onecontroller is operative to compare the amount of light received atdifferent times, such as between card reading transaction steps, todetect a change that corresponds to installation of an unauthorized cardreading device. Alternately or in addition, the at least one controllermay operate to monitor signals from the at least one sensor at timesbetween transactions for changes which correspond to the installation ofan unauthorized card reading device. In still other embodiments the atleast one controller may be programmed to not identify certain changesas corresponding to the installation of an unauthorized reading device.This may include, for example, changes in radiation for card insertion,changes due to fingers placed against the slot by a user, such as ablind user, and other conditions that may cause a temporary drop inradiation sensed. In some embodiments the programming of the controllermay disregard certain conditions based on the then-current operationalstatus of the machine, such as receiving or delivering a card, forexample. In some embodiments the at least one controller may executefuzzy logic to determine events that correspond to installation of anunauthorized card reading device. Of course these approaches are merelyexample.

In still other embodiments the card slot may be bounded by one or morelight reflecting surfaces. Such light reflecting surfaces may beconfigured to facilitate detecting the installation of an unauthorizedcard reading device. For example, in some embodiments, multiple opposedside surfaces bounding a card slot may be comprised of reflectivematerial. Such material may be operative to normally conduct moreradiation through the slot from outside the machine to the at least onesensor within the machine housing. Therefore, in some embodiments thisconfiguration may cause a greater reduction in radiation reaching the atleast one sensor when an unauthorized card reading device is installed.

In still other embodiments the reflective surfaces may be tapered orotherwise contoured to facilitate detection of changes in radiation thatresult from an unauthorized card reading device. For example, in someembodiments one or more reflective surfaces may be contoured to increasethe amount of light that passes through the card slot to the at leastone sensor. However, in some embodiments one or more reflective surfacesmay be contoured to reflect at least some light falling on the card slotso it does not reach the sensor. This may be useful in embodiments wherethe card slot is subject to exposure to a wide range of radiationlevels, and restricting the radiation that reaches the at least onesensor facilitates identifying a change that indicates the installationof an unauthorized card reading device. In still other embodiments,reflective surfaces may facilitate directing radiation to at least onesensor within the machine. This may include using a contoured mirrorsurface that focuses visible radiation for example.

Further, in some embodiments a mirror surface may be used on only oneside of the slot. This may be done, for example, to provide reflectionof radiation on a side of a slot opposite the slot side adjacentmagnetic stripes of cards. Thus an unauthorized card reading device islikely to be positioned at least on the slot side opposite of thereflective surface, which may reduce radiation reading the reflectivesurface. This may help in detecting certain types of unauthorized cardreading devices. An example is shown in FIG. 19 which includes a fasciasurface 336 through which a card reader housing 338 extends. The cardreader housing includes a card slot 340 through which cards pass. Thecard reader includes within the machine, a card reader mechanism 342,which includes a read head 344. The mechanism operates responsive to atleast one controller to selectively move magnetic stripe cards byengagement with the rollers shown, so that data in the stripe is read bythe read head.

In this example embodiment, at least one reflective surface 346 ispositioned on a side of the slot opposed of the side of the slot whichis adjacent the stripe on cards which pass through the slot. At leastone sensor 347 is positioned on the side of the slot opposite thereflective surface. As can be appreciated, an unauthorized readingdevice will generally be positioned ahead of the opening to the cardslot and will extend at least on the side of the slot on which magneticstripes of cards are positioned. As can be appreciated from the arrowshown in phantom, an unauthorized card reading device in this positionwill generally reduce the amount of light reflected from surface 346 tothe sensing device. As a result, signals from the sensing device can beused by at least one controller to determine when an unauthorized cardreading device has been installed. Of course these approaches are merelyexample of approaches that may be used.

FIG. 20 shows an alternative embodiment which includes apparatus fordetecting the presence of an unauthorized device adjacent a usertransaction location on an automated banking machine. In someembodiments the user transaction location may include the area adjacentthe card reader slot as previously discussed. Alternatively or inaddition, the user transaction location may include all or a portion ofa keypad on the automated banking machine. In still other embodimentsthe user transaction location monitored may include a cash outlet of thecash dispenser in the machine and through which cash is delivered tousers. Other example user transaction locations monitored may include adeposit opening through which deposits, envelopes, checks, cash or otheritems are accepted into the machine. In still other embodiments otheruser transaction locations may be monitored through use of the exampleapparatus for the presence of an unauthorized device. Various usertransaction locations on the automated banking machine that aremonitored may include locations where items are input to the machine byusers or delivered from the machine to users.

The example apparatus 350 shown in FIG. 20 includes a radiation outputdevice 352. The radiation output device emits radiation responsive tosignals from control circuitry schematically indicated 354. In anexample embodiment the radiation output device includes an infrared (IR)light emitting diode (LED). It should be understood that although oneradiation output device is shown which is of a particular type,alternative embodiments may include multiple radiation output devices oftheft type or radiation output devices of other types.

The apparatus also includes a radiation sensing device 356. In anexample embodiment the radiation sensing device comprises a photo diodesuitable for sensing IR radiation. Of course it should be understoodthat in other embodiments other types and numbers of radiation sensingdevices may be used.

The radiation sensing device 356 is also in operative connection withcontrol circuitry 354. In an example embodiment the control circuitryincludes gain control circuitry schematically indicated 358. Asdiscussed later in greater detail, the example gain control circuitry isoperative to amplify signals from the radiation sensing device in amanner which provides greater signal amplification when lower ambientlight levels are being sensed. The example control circuitry alsoincludes circuitry 360 which is operative to convert the amplifiedanalog signals to digital signals. The example control circuitry alsoincludes at least one controller 362. The controller includes at leastone processor that operates in accordance with its associatedprogramming. In some embodiments the controller may cause operation ofother devices in the machine while in other embodiments the controllermay be associated only with the radiation detection functions. Of courseit should be understood that the gain control circuitry 354 is exampleand in other embodiments other approaches may be used.

In an example embodiment the infrared LED 352 in the photo diode 356 arepositioned on the machine physically close to each other and both faceoutward from the surface of the machine at the user transaction locationgenerally indicated 364. In an example embodiment the control circuitryoperates to cause the LED to output infrared pulses which have aduration of about 20 to 100 milliseconds. In an example embodiment thesepulses are output on an intermittent and regular periodic basis. Ofcourse in other embodiments other approaches may be used.

In operation the example control circuitry is operative to determinedata corresponding to a level of radiation sensed by the photo diode 356when the LED is off. The control circuitry is also operative todetermine data corresponding to the magnitude of radiation that reachesthe photo diode when the LED 352 is on. In this particular arrangementthe amount of radiation generated by the LED 352 that is reflected tothe photo diode 356 increases when an unauthorized device, schematicallyindicated 366 is installed on the machine. Such a device may include forexample an unauthorized card reading device of the types previouslydiscussed.

If an unauthorized device is present, the radiation pulses are generallyreflected from the unauthorized device and are sensed by the photodiode. The amount of radiation reflected is often dependent on thedistance that the unauthorized device is disposed from the radiationoutput device. The amount of reflected radiation is often also dependenton the material reflectivity of the unauthorized device as well as theparticular geometry of the unauthorized device in the area adjacent theuser transaction location. As a general proposition the closer theunauthorized device is positioned to the photo diode, the more infraredradiation that will be reflected to the photo diode. The greatermagnitude of reflected radiation results in a larger output from theradiation sensing device 356.

In an example embodiment the probable presence of the unauthorizeddevice is determined by the control circuitry comparing the magnitude ofthe signal that results from the reflected radiation pulse, as well assuch signal having an elevated magnitude that continues through aplurality of cycles and/or for at least a set time. In an exampleembodiment if the elevated level of reflected radiation continues for apredetermined time period, then the control circuitry is operative tocause the automated banking machine to take at least one action. Theseactions may be of the type previously described, such as to conductfurther analysis as to whether an unauthorized device is present.Alternatively or in addition, the control circuitry may be operative toprovide at least one output indicative of an abnormal condition at theautomated banking machine. Of course it should be understood that theseapproaches are example.

FIG. 22 shows an example schematic logic flow executed through operationof the at least one processor that is included with the controlcircuitry. The processor operates responsive to computer executableinstructions. Prior to operation the at least one processor has storedin a memory associated therewith, at least one threshold value. This atleast one threshold value is indicative of the level of radiation beingreflected to the radiation sensing device relative to the ambient levelof radiation, corresponding to a probable abnormal condition. Theprogramming of this at least one threshold value is represented by astep 268. Also prior to operation, the memory associated with the atleast one processor is programmed to include at least one timer value.This at least one time value corresponds to at least one time period. Ifduring this time period the level of reflected IR radiation relative tothe level of ambient IR radiation exceeds a threshold, the controlcircuitry is operative to determine that there is an abnormal conditionwhich corresponds to the probable installation of a fraud device. Thisis represented in a step 370. Of course it should be understood thatthese steps are examples, and in other embodiments data corresponding toradiation sensed by the radiation sensing device may be compared tomultiple threshold values or conditions. Likewise in other embodimentsother or additional time periods or logic values may be used todetermine the probable presence of an abnormal condition. In still otherembodiments time periods and threshold values may be variable andcalculated by the at least one processor responsive to one or moresensed values or parameters.

In an example embodiment, after loading the initial values in the memorythe control circuitry operates in the manner discussed. The controlcircuitry determines data that corresponds to the level of ambientradiation reaching the photo diode at a time when the LED is notoperating. This is represented in a step 372. The control circuitrythrough this step is operative to determine data at a first level thatcorresponds to the then current level of ambient radiation. The controlcircuitry then is operative to determine data that corresponds to thelevel of reflected radiation at a time while the LED is operated. Thisis represented by a step 374. The control circuitry then operates todetermine in a step 376 if the data corresponding to the reflectedradiation is at least as great as the level of ambient radiation. Ifnot, the at least one processor returns to the logic flow step 372.

If in step 376 the level of radiation determined when the LED isoperating is at least as great as the level of ambient radiation sensed,the control circuitry is operative to calculate a difference value. Thisis represented in a step 378. In an example embodiment the differencevalue corresponds to the data corresponding to the level of radiationwhen the LED is operating minus the value corresponding to the level ofradiation when the LED is not operating. In an example embodiment, thecalculation is done using the two immediately preceding values. However,it should be understood that in other embodiments other approaches maybe used such as using averages of a plurality of preceding cycles, usinga portion of the difference in magnitude values and/or using adjustedvalues that discard certain single abnormal data points (for example)for purposes of carrying out the calculation which corresponds to thedifference in the radiation sensed compared to the level of ambientradiation.

In an example embodiment the difference value calculated in step 378 isthen compared to the programmed threshold stored in connection with thecontrol circuitry in step 368. This comparison is executed in a step380. In the example step 380 the at least one processor is operative todetermine if the difference value is at least as great as the thresholdvalue. If so the at least one processor of the control circuitry checksin a step 382, to determine if a countdown timer function has beenstarted. If not, the control circuitry operates to start the countdowntimer in a step 384. In an example embodiment the countdown timer isoperative to determine if the difference value remains at least as greatas the threshold for the stored set period of time. If it does then thecontrol circuitry is operative to determine that an abnormal conditionlikely exists. Of course it should be understood that while in anexample embodiment time values are used for purposes of determining anabnormal condition. In other embodiments other approaches may be taken.These may include for example counting the number of cycles during whichone or more difference values exceed one or more thresholds. Theseapproaches may include for example a number of consecutive radiationoutput cycles, or alternatively the determination could be based onradiation values during a number of cycles within a given sample beingin excess of a particular threshold. Also as previously discusseddeterminations may be based on multiple different thresholds and/orother parameters. Of course these approaches are example.

As shown in FIG. 22, if in step 380 the difference value is not at leastas great as the threshold, the control circuitry determines in a step386 if the countdown timer has been started. If not, the process repeatsand the ambient value is again determined. However, if in step 386 thecountdown timer has been previously started and the different value isnot above the threshold, a step 388 is executed in which the countdowntimer is stopped. In these circumstances the control circuitry is nolonger calculating a time period in which a condition existscontinuously which suggests an abnormal condition. For example, it canbe appreciated that in cases where users are operating devices on anautomated banking machine, the user's fingers or other objects may causeradiation levels that are sensed to vary during relatively limitedperiods of time. However, in general these conditions which effect thesensed radiation levels are soon removed and the sensed radiation levelswill return to a level consistent with normal operation of the machine.An example embodiment of the control circuitry is able to deal with suchcircumstances by providing that a suspect condition must exist for asufficient period of time before an abnormal condition at the machine isindicated. Of course this approach is example.

In circumstances where in step 380 the difference value is at least asgreat as the threshold value, it is determined in step 382 that thecountdown timer has already been started. In response to this conditiona step 390 is carried out. In step 390 the control circuitry isoperative to determine if the time period which corresponds to anabnormal condition has been reached. If not, the sensing processcontinues. However, if the difference value has been at least as greatas the threshold value for the set time period as determined in step390, the control circuitry is operative to set an alarm condition event.This is represented in a step 392. In an example embodiment step 392also includes the control circuitry operating to cause the machine totake at least one action. The at least one action may include forexample, causing the at least one controller in the machine to takesteps to determine if an improper device has been attached to themachine. Alternatively and/or in addition the control circuitry mayoperate to generate one or more signals which cause the banking machineto provide at least one output to indicate an abnormal condition. Thisat least one output may include for example, taking steps to make themachine inoperative or provide one or more outputs to inform users ofthe presence of a possible fraud device. Alternatively or in additionthe at least one output may include the machine sending a message toanother location or to an operator such as a bank or to a servicerentity that there is a problem with the machine. Of course theseapproaches are example.

In operation of the example control circuitry, even after an abnormalcondition has been indicated, the control circuitry continues to operateto evaluate the radiation levels reaching the radiation sensing device.This is represented by a step 394. Thereafter the control circuitry isoperative to determine a value corresponding to the level of radiationsensed while the LED is operating. This is represented in a step 396.

In an example embodiment the control circuitry continues to operate tocompare the data corresponding to the ambient values and the valueswhile the emitter operates to determine if the data corresponding to thereflected value is at least as great as the ambient value. This isindicated in a step 398. A difference value is then calculated in a step400 through subtraction of the data corresponding to the ambient valuefrom the data corresponding to the sensed value when the LED isoperating. Thereafter the difference value is compared to the thresholdvalue to determine if the difference value is at least as great as thethreshold. This is represented in a step 402.

In an example embodiment the control circuitry is operative to provideat least one output to indicate that the abnormal condition which waspreviously determined has been cleared responsive to a negativedetermination in step 402. This is represented in a step 404. Of coursein some example embodiments at least one controller may operate tocontinue to send messages and provide outputs to indicate the probableabnormal condition. Likewise in still other example embodiments, the atleast one controller may operate responsive to other inputs or teststhat it has carried out, to determine that an abnormal condition doesnot exist. Thereafter the at least one controller may operate inaccordance with its programming to take steps to inform a remoteservicer or other entity that there is not an abnormal condition at themachine. The remote servicer may check the machine remotely throughmessages that cause the machine to carry out additional tests for thepresence of fraudulent devices and/or may view images from camerasadjacent to the machine. In still other example embodiments other stepsor actions may be taken to determine and/or clear the presence ofunauthorized devices. Of course these approaches are example.

FIG. 21 shows an example form of the control circuitry 358. In anexample embodiment the LED 352 is driven by a square wave signalresponsive to the controller 362. As previously discussed, in an exampleembodiment the radiation output device is operative to provide regularperiodic intermittent pulses. These pulses are determined through theprogramming of the controller and may be of various durations. However,in an example embodiment the pulses are set at a fixed duration. Asuitable length of the duration for this particular embodiment has beenfound to be in a range of about 20 to 100 milliseconds.

In an example embodiment a dual gain approach is used to provide greatersensitivity during times when the ambient radiation levels arerelatively low. This may include for example operation of the automatedbanking machine in indoor or nighttime environments. The gain circuitryof example embodiments includes a selectable dual gain transimpedanceamplifier schematically indicated 406. In an example embodiment, thegain which corresponds to the amount of amplification of the signal fromthe radiation sensing device is determined by selectively switching oneof two possible gain impedances with the transimpedance amplifierfeedback circuit. An electronic switch 407 is selectively operativeresponsive to the controller 362 to cause the dual gain transimpedanceamplifier to provide higher gain and greater amplification of thesignals from the photo diode responsive to the photo diode sensingambient light levels at or below a particular threshold. Similarlyresponsive to the level of ambient light being determined as above thethreshold the switch 407 is operated responsive to the controller tocause the lower gain for the photo diode signals to be provided.

This example approach provides appropriate amplification based on thelevel of currently sensed ambient radiation and helps to assure that thepresence of unauthorized devices may be more readily detected in lowerambient light level conditions. It should be understood however that theapproach shown as example. For example in other embodiments, other typesof gain circuitry may be used such as those that provide a plurality oflevels of gain responsive to ambient light and/or other parameters thatare sensed. These may include for example, several different levels ofamplification which correspond to particular conditions at the machine.Alternatively or in addition, other sensors may be used for purposes ofdetermining radiation levels in other areas of the machine. Such signalsfrom other sensors may be used by one or more controllers in the machineto make further evaluations as to possible abnormal conditions. Ofcourse these approaches are example and in other embodiments otherapproaches may be used.

FIG. 23 shows an alternative form of control circuitry generallyindicated 410 which may be used in alternative embodiments of anautomated banking machine which detects an unauthorized device at atransaction location on the machine. In an example embodiment thecircuitry may be part of the circuitry which is operative to controloperation of an automated banking machines of the types previouslydescribed. Of course it should be understood that aspects of an exampleembodiment may be used in other devices as well.

The example arrangement includes at least one radiation output devicewhich includes an infrared LED 412. The arrangement further includes atleast one radiation detecting device which in an example embodimentincludes a photo diode 414. The photo diode 414 is operative to senseinfrared radiation of the type output by LED 412. As representedschematically in FIG. 23 an example embodiment includes driver circuitrythat is operative to cause the LED 412 to output radiation. The drivercircuitry of an example embodiment is a square wave oscillator 416. Thesquare wave oscillator causes the LED to output radiation periodicallyand on a fifty percent duty cycle, in an example arrangement the LED isdriven by a square wave signal and operates at a frequency of 10 KHz. Ofcourse this approach is example and in other embodiments otherapproaches may be used.

In an example embodiment the photo diode is operative to output at leastone signal corresponding to the magnitude of radiation sensed, toamplifier circuitry schematically indicated 418. The amplifier circuitryof an example embodiment amplifies the signals from the photo diode, andthe level of amplification determines sensitivity of the controllercircuitry.

The example amplifier 418 is operative to output one or more signalscorresponding to radiation sensed, to phase sensitive detector circuitryschematically indicated 420. The phase sensitive detector circuitry issynchronized with a square wave oscillator 416. Circuitry 420 operatesin an example embodiment as a full wave rectifier that is sensitive tophase alignment of the input signal with the reference square wave thatdrives LED 412. As a result the circuitry 420 is operative to producesignals that correspond to the magnitude of radiation sensed during thetime period that the LED is operating to output radiation. In addition,in an example embodiment circuitry 420 is operative to attenuate thesignals output therefrom in accordance with radiation that is senseddirectly from the LED by the photo diode. This aspect is later discussedand enables an example embodiment to produce sensed signals for eachcycle that corresponds to radiation reflected from a possibleunauthorized sensing device and to minimize the effects of possibledirect sensing of radiation output from the LED. Of course theseapproaches are example.

The sensor signals that are output from circuitry 420 are passed tocircuitry 422. In an example embodiment circuitry 422 includes anintegrator/low pass filter. The integrator/low pass filter is operativeto integrate sensed values corresponding to each of the sensor signalsoutput from circuitry 420. Example circuitry 422 integrates thedemodulated signals over a defined time period. The defined time periodin an example embodiment comprises a plurality of cycles of the LED. Thenumber of cycles over which the values are integrated may be selectivelyset for the particular circuitry to suit the particular machinearrangement and/or transaction location in which the sensing isconducted.

Circuitry 422 provides the values corresponding to the integrated outputto an analog to digital converter schematically indicated 424. Theanalog to digital converter provides digital outputs to at least oneprocessor 426. In an example embodiment the processor is operative tocompare the integrated value of the sensed values over a plurality ofcycles, to one or more thresholds that are stored in memory associatedwith the processor. In situations where the at last one value receivedfrom the analog to digital converter 424 is in excess of a threshold,the at least one processor 426 operates in accordance with itsprogramming to provide at least one output. This at least one outputcauses the controller or other devices in the automated banking machineto take at least one action. The at least one action may include forexample, providing an alarm signal, notifying remote locations or takingother steps of the types previously described.

FIG. 24 shows example circuitry which corresponds to the schematic shownin FIG. 23. In this example embodiment the LED 412 operates to emitradiation intermittently during a desired period of operation inaccordance with a fifty percent duty cycle. The transconductanceamplifier 418 operates to amplify the signals from photo diode 414. Thiscircuitry further includes a first stage amplifier 428 that is used tobias the signal. The first stage amplifier also has its input signalconditioned so as to subtract out the effect of radiation that is senseddirectly from the LED by the further diode 414. This is accomplished inthe example circuitry through the use of a connection through theresistor designated 430. The circuitry helps to assure that the totaloutput voltage swing is available for the signal output. The value ofresistor 430 is selected to remove that portion of the “cross talk” thatoccurs between the particular configuration of the LED and photo diode.In an example embodiment this avoids the need for light pipes or otherdevices to reduce the incidence of radiation directly from the LEDreaching the photo diode. Of course this approach is example and inother embodiments other approaches may be used.

In an example embodiment the at least one controller in the automatedbanking machine operates to cause the machine to carry out transactions.A transaction location such as the card reader slot, to which the LEDand photo diode are adjacent, is utilized in the operation of themachine to carry out a transaction function. As in the case of the otherdescribed embodiments, placement of an unauthorized device schematicallyindicated 432 in FIG. 23 causes the level of radiation output from theLED and reflected to the photo diode 414 to increase. This is a functionof the particular configuration of the transaction location at which thesystem is used. The control circuitry is operative in this exampleembodiment to produce signals corresponding to the sensed radiation onlyduring the time periods that the LED operates to output radiation. Thephase sensitive detector circuitry 420 operates to output a plurality ofsensor signals, each corresponding to a particular cycle in which theLED outputs radiation. The values corresponding to sensor signals isintegrated by the circuitry 422 over a set comprising a plurality ofcycles. This integration produces a value that is then output to theanalog to digital converter 424. The comparison of this value is thenmade through operation of the processor 426 to at least one threshold.When the value is below the threshold the amount of reflected radiationis considered to be indicative that no abnormal condition exists becauseno unusual amount of radiation is being reflected to the photo diode.

In circumstances where the amount of reflected radiation increases, theat least one value produced by the circuitry will be in excess of athreshold. The processor 426 operates in accordance with its programmedinstructions to output at least one signal. The at least one signal thencauses at least one action by the ATM of the types previously discussed.

While in an example embodiment the control circuitry operates tointegrate sensed values for a plurality of sets of cycles which aregathered sequentially, in other embodiments other approaches togathering data may be used. This may include for example, integratingsensed values for a plurality of cycles in which the cycles in the setsmay substantially overlap. Thus for example if the period of integrationis ten cycles, each set may overlap the other set by a plurality ofcycles. Indeed in some embodiments the immediately succeeding set mayoverlap the immediately preceding set by all but one cycle. In this waysome embodiments may provide for monitoring such that an abnormalcondition is more rapidly detected.

In other example embodiments provision may be made for including in aset sensed values, data corresponding to cycles that are not immediatelyadjacent. For example in some embodiments, sampling circuitry may beincluded such that values corresponding to one of each of severalcycles, may be included in a set for purposes of producing at least onevalue. In this way the amount of data analyzed may be reduced, and insome embodiments the effects of temporary fluctuations in the amount ofreflected radiation may be minimized so as to reduce the possibility offalse alarms. As referred to herein however, in cases where a samplingof cycles is described as conducted for sensed values, those values thatare sampled shad be considered immediately adjacent cycles even thoughthe driving circuitry may operate to produce numerous radiation outputcycles intermediate of those cycles for which radiation sensed issampled.

Further while in an example embodiment only one radiation output deviceand radiation sensing device are shown, other embodiments may include aplurality of either output devices and/or input devices. Also while inan example embodiment the attenuation of sensed signals is accomplishedthrough circuitry providing a fixed resistance, other embodiments mayprovide for variable resistance and more active attenuation. This may bedone for example by including one or more sensors that operate to sensea degree of radiation which moves along a path directly between the oneor more radiation output devices and radiation sensing devices. Theoutputs of such sensors may be used to provide active variableattenuation of the sensed signal. Of course other approaches may also beused.

In an example embodiment the ATM 10 is provided with enhanced diagnosticcapabilities as well as the ability for servicers to more readilyperform remedial and preventive maintenance on the machine. This isaccomplished in an example embodiment by programming the controllerand/or alternatively distributed controllers and processors associatedwith the transaction function devices, to sense and capture diagnosticdata concerning the operation of the various transaction functiondevices. In an example embodiment this diagnostic data may include morethan an indication of a disabling malfunction. In some embodiments andwith regard to some transaction function devices, the data may includefor example instances of speed, intensity, deflection, vacuum, force,friction, pressure, sound, vibration, wear, or other parameters that maybe of significance for purposes of detecting conditions that may bedeveloping with regard to the machine and the transaction functiondevices contained therein. The nature of the diagnostic data that may beobtained will depend on the particular transaction function devices andthe capabilities thereof as well as the programming of the controllerswithin the machine.

The following applications and patents are incorporated herein byreference in their entirety. Provisional Application Ser. No. 60/853,098filed Oct. 20, 2006; U.S. application Ser. No. 11/454,257 filed Jun. 16,2006; U.S. application Ser. No. 10/832,960 filed Apr. 27, 2004; U.S.application Ser. No. 10/601,813 filed Jun. 23, 2003; ProvisionalApplication 60/429,478 filed Nov. 26, 2002; and Provisional Application60/560,674 filed Apr. 7, 2004.

Still example embodiments may include other or additional features. Suchfeatures of example embodiments are described in connection with anautomated banking machine generally indicated 510 in FIG. 25. Machine510 includes a fascia generally indicated as component 512. The fascia512 is generally positioned in supporting connection with a machine'shousing and/or other machine components of the type previouslydescribed. In this example embodiment, fascia 512 extends through a wall514 or other similar fascia supporting structure. Of course thisapproach is example, and in other embodiments other approaches may beused.

Automated banking machine 510 includes a card reader positioned withinthe machine that is associated with a card reader slot 516 which extendsthrough the fascia. A card reader bezel 517 includes and is in generallysurrounding relation of the card reader slot. The card reader can alsohave an appropriate indicator and sensors adjacent to the card readerslot such as those that have been previously discussed. The machineincludes a keypad 518 of the type previously described through which auser may provide manual inputs. Further, an example embodiment includesa plurality of function keys 520 which are positioned adjacent to adisplay 524. Function keys 520 may be actuated to provide inputscorresponding to selections that are output on the display.

An example embodiment further includes a camera 522 which may be used tocapture images of users of the machine. Camera 522 may also oralternatively serve as a biometric input device for purposes ofrecognizing users via appearance features such as through facialrecognition in the manner discussed in the incorporated disclosure.

An area above the fascia generally indicated 515 includes speakeropenings 526. The speaker openings enable audible outputs from speakersincluded in the machine to be output to users. A headphone jack 528enables users to connect headphones or other audible output devices tothe machine. This enables blind users or persons who may havedisabilities that require operation of the machine through voiceguidance, to receive audible outputs concerning operation of themachine.

The example machine further includes a depository such as a checkacceptor. The check acceptor has an associated check accepting opening530 in the fascia. A light indicator 531 is positioned adjacent to theopening 530 so as to indicate the status of the check acceptor. Thus,for example, in example embodiments when a user indicates that they wishto deposit a check into the machine, the light indicator 531 may operateto provide a visible indication of the location of the check readerslot. Alternatively or in addition, the light indicator may provide agreen indicator to indicate in such circumstances that the checkacceptor is operational. Alternatively in some embodiments, theindicator may provide a yellow or red indication to indicate otherconditions such as that the check acceptor is operating and cannotprocess further checks, or that the check acceptor has malfunctioned. Ofcourse these approaches are example and in other embodiments, otherapproaches may be used.

In an example embodiment the machine includes a cash dispenser whichoperates to dispense cash to users through a cash outlet opening 542.The cash outlet opening includes a gate 538 which operates to open whencash is to be dispensed therefrom. A visual indicator 543 is positionedadjacent to the cash outlet opening. The visual indicator may operate toprovide an indication of when cash is being dispensed or has beenpresented to a user. For example, the visual indicator may operate toindicate to a machine user the location at which they may take the cashdispensed from the machine. Alternatively or in addition, the indicator543 may operate to indicate conditions such as that the cash dispenserhas malfunctioned or is not available, so as to provide an indicationthat the machine cannot carry out cash dispensing transactions.

In an example embodiment, the machine 510 further includes an envelopedepository. The fascia includes an opening 540 through which envelopesmay be accepted for deposit into the machine. Access through the opening540 is controlled through a movable gate 544. The gate 544 is openedthrough operation of the machine at appropriate times in transactionsequences when a deposit envelope can be accepted. An indicator 541 ispositioned adjacent to the envelope accepting opening 540. The Indicatormay operate in example embodiments in the manner of the other indicatorsso as to indicate to users when the envelope accepting depository canaccept envelopes therein. Likewise the indicator may also oralternatively indicate conditions that the envelope accepting opening isinoperative or is otherwise not available.

The example fascia further includes a receipt dispensing opening 545.The receipt dispensing opening 545 is operative to deliver receiptsproduced by a receipt printer within the machine. The receipt dispensingopening 545 further has an indicator adjacent thereto which can beoperated to indicate that a receipt has been presented and can guide theuser to the opening so they may take the receipt. Like the otherindicators, the indicator adjacent to the receipt opening may alsooperate to indicate that the receipt printer is not available due to amalfunction or other conditions.

It should be appreciated that in some example embodiments, theindicators may operate in a flashing manner to indicate variousconditions. The indicators may provide various color outputs so as toindicate various conditions. This may include, for example, a yellowindication when a function is being performed by the correspondingdevice; a green indication when the device is ready to operate; and ared indication when the device has malfunctioned or is unavailable. Ofcourse alternative approaches may be used. It should be appreciated thatthe programming associated with the at least one processor included inthe machine may be operative to control the indicators so as to providethe programmed indications to machine users.

In an example embodiment, the machine fascia 512 includes severalbezels. An example bezel is a removable component of an outer fasciaportion which covers at least part of the user side (front) of afunction device of an automated banking machine. A fascia bezel can havean opening that leads to its associated function device. An examplefascia can have plurality of distinct bezels, including a card readerbezel, display device bezel, cash outlet bezel, deposit input bezel,receipt bezel, keypad bezel, etc. The card reader bezel 517 has anopening (i.e., card slot 516) that leads to the card reader. A displaydevice bezel can have an opening (which may have a transparent cover)that allows a machine user to see the user display screen 524. The cashoutlet bezel has the cash outlet opening 542 through which cash can bedispensed by the machine. A deposit input bezel can have a slot (e.g.,check accepting opening 530; envelope accepting opening 540) throughwhich a deposit (e.g., checks, currency bills, envelopes, etc.) can bereceived by the machine (or an acceptor device thereof). The receiptbezel has the receipt dispensing opening 545 that leads from atransaction receipt printer. A keypad bezel can have an opening throughwhich a machine user can provide manual inputs to the keypad 518. As canbe seen, an individual bezel can be a part of a fascia's bodywork thatsurrounds (either physical or visual) user access to an individualfunction device of the machine.

An example machine includes a user data reader and a bezel having a userdata receiving area. The user data reader is operable to read user dataprovided to the user data receiving area. In an example, a card reader(i.e., a user data reader) is operable to read card data insertedthrough a bezel's card slot (i.e., a user data receiving area). In afurther example, a wireless reader (i.e., a user data reader) isoperable to wirelessly read user data that is placed adjacent to adesignated reading area (i.e., a user data receiving area) of a bezel.An example machine includes at least one wireless reader that can read asmart card chip data, RFID data, NFC data, magnetic data, IR data, barcode data, electronic ink data, and/or radioactive data, etc.

A machine fascia bezel may function as intermediate structure (or acomponent) between the machine user and the user function device. Themachine bezel may also be shaped to enhance user utilization of thefunction device. For example, a card reader bezel can have a tapered (ornarrowing) slot that guides a user's card toward a correct orientationfor proper entry into the card reader. A card accepting area (e.g., aslot) of a card reader may be aligned with a card reader bezel's slot.The (parallel) alignment of two slots can encompass several differentslot relationship arrangements, including having: (1) a card reader'sslot extending at least partly into a bezel's slot; (2) a bezel's slotextending at least partly into a card reader's slot; or (3) the twoslots being set end-to-end (in either abutting or non-abuttingrelation). When a first slot ex tends into a second slot, then at leastpart of the second slot surrounds at least part of the first slot. Ofcourse each bezel slot is formed by bezel structure, and each cardreader slot is formed by card reader structure (or other structureoperatively associated therewith).

The various types of bezels may be supported by the machine fascia, bythe housing, by its associated function (or transaction) device, by acombination thereof, or by other structure associated with the machine.A bezel may also function to retain or provide some support to itsassociated function device. Other types of bezels are known in otherfields. For example, with regard to a typical television, a displaybezel can be the front surround of the TV screen. With regard to anautomotive vehicle, a particular bezel can be the bodywork structurethat surrounds a particular light.

As discussed in more detail later, an automated banking machine isconfigured to use exchangeable (or interchangeable) bezels for aspecific function device. For example, each of a plurality ofdifferently-shaped replaceable card reader bezels can be individuallyused (in succession or randomly) as the current card reader bezel of themachine. The machine is configured for easy exchange of the card readerbezels. Frequent replacement of the current card reader bezel withanother card reader bezel that has a differently-shaped outer surfaceleading to the bezel's card slot can act to deter attachment of afraudulent card reader. That is, the fixed shape of a particularfraudulent card reader may not be clandestinely usable (or structurallyattachable) with each of the differently-shaped card reader bezels.

In an example embodiment, the machine fascia 512 includes a bezel 517 asshown in FIGS. 26-28. FIG. 26 shows an isometric view including the cardreader bezel 517 of an example embodiment. The card reader bezel 517includes the card reader slot 516. The card reader slot 516 has insurrounding relation thereof a transparent yoke or donut 430, as shownin FIG. 28. The donut portion 430 (of the card reader bezel) surroundsthe bezel's card reader slot 516. The donut of an example embodiment isconfigured to be positioned in adjacent relation with visible andinfrared sensors and emitters of the type previously discussed, so thatthe presence of unauthorized devices adjacent thereto can be detected.In an example embodiment, the translucent or transparent nature of thedonut 430 operates to enable radiation to pass therethrough from theemitters and sensors that are positioned within the machine behind thedonut so that unauthorized devices and other conditions can be detected.FIG. 28 also shows a fastening member 519 that can be securely fastenedto bezel supporting structure of the machine.

FIGS. 28A, 28B, and 28C show different (angled) views of a card slotbezel that is similar to the bezel shown in FIG. 28, but without thefastening member. Thus, for ease of understanding, the bezel in FIGS.28A, 28B, and 28C has also been labeled with reference numeral 517. Ascan be seen, the bezel in FIGS. 28A, 28B, and 28C has an exteriorsurface 521. The exterior surface 521 comprises a contoured (shaped)profile 523. The profile 523 can include protrusions, curves, angles,indents, slots, and topographical (physical) features of variousextensions, lengths, and heights, etc. The contoured profile surroundsthe entrance 525 to the card slot 516 of the bezel 517. That is, thecard slot entrance 525 extends through a outer surface area that istopographically non uniform (e.g., not horizontally level, irregularsurface). The surface is non uniform (in physical form) in the outwarddirection (e.g., direction away from the machine). That is, respectivedifferent portions 521A, 521B of the outer surface vary in the outwardinward length (or distance) they extend.

The card slot entrance 525 also has at least one portion (or section)525A that is further outward inward than at least one other portion 525Bof the card slot entrance. The card slot entrance 525 can be part of thebezel's exterior surface 521. At least a portion of the card slotentrance 525 can be tangible to the machine user. As can be seen, outersurface portions of the bezel profile that are adjacent to (or bound orsurround) the card slot entrance 525 can vary in their outwardlyextending distance.

In an example embodiment, a bezel can be of an integral, one-piece,unitary structure. An example bezel may comprise plastic, polymer,rubber, and/or fiberglass material. The bezel can also be made of thesame material as the remainder of the machine fascia. The bezel can havean exterior color or pattern that matches the rest of the fascia front.

As discussed, the example bezel 517 is configured so that its cardreader slot (or entrance thereto) does not present a generally uniformhorizontal outer surface. Rather as shown, the bezel outer surfaceincludes at least two generally horizontally offset portions connectedby an intermediate section. This outer surface configuration makes itmore difficult to attach a skimming device to the exterior of the cardslot bezel. This is because the irregular outer surface would require askimmer device to have a similar corresponding complex surface so as toattach thereto in a way that would be unnoticed.

In some example embodiments, the exterior surface of the bezel caninclude an anti-stick coating. This can include, for example, a paint orpowder coating that includes a silicone material which makes itdifficult to attach an unauthorized device thereto via an adhesive orother similar sticky materials. The coating makes it difficult forcriminals to attach a skimming device to the bezel. In anotherembodiment, a bezel's outer surface can comprise spun fiberglass strandsthat are coated with tetrafluoroethylene (TFE) fluorocarbon polymer or afluorinated ethylene-propylene (FEF) resin. For example, the anti-stickcoating can comprise Teflon®.

Further in example embodiments, the bezel 517 can include multiplecolored elements such as elements 432 and 434 shown in FIG. 27. Elements432 and 434 can differ in color from the surrounding bezel. Suchelements and the contrasting colors thereof may make it difficult for askimmer to be attached in a way that does not cause it to be noticeablebecause of the color contrast. Further, such elements can include logos,designs, or other indicia that further make it difficult for anyskimming device to be attached in the area thereof without beingnoticed. In addition, the inclusion of such indicia provide a visibleindicator to an exterior camera or other detecting device which enablesa determination to be made that a bezel has been subject to modificationvia analysis of captured images of the fascia of the machine. Thetransparency of the yoke 430 also makes it easier to notice a(non-transparent) fraudulent device attached or adjacent thereto. Ofcourse these approaches are example, and in other embodiments otherapproaches can be used.

In some example embodiments, the fascia of the machine can incorporatedifferent card surrounding bezel configuration designs. Such cardsurrounding bezel designs can be made readily manually changeable orinterchangeable by authorized service persons who have authorization toremove/replace the bezel. In some bezel support arrangements, accessingthe bezel may only be feasible through an interior area of the machine.

As shown in FIG. 29, an example bezel 517 includes fastener acceptingopenings 436, 442 which are operatively configured to accept fastenersthat extend through internal bezel-supporting structure of the machine.For example, the fastener accepting openings 442 are configured toreceive removable fasteners 440 (e.g., bolts, screws, pins, etc.) thatextend through corresponding openings 441 in a card reader holderassembly 438 of the machine. The fasteners 440 allow the bezel 517 to begenerally readily engaged and disengaged from the card reader holderassembly 438 (and the machine and the fascia). The other fasteneraccepting openings 436 are configured to receive other fasteners thatoperatively connect the bezel to other bezel supporting structure, suchas a card reader, a fascia portion, or other machine structure. As canbe seen, FIG. 29 shows at least one fastener 440 releasibly holding acard slot bezel 517 in fixed operatively supported engagement with abezel support structure 438 of an automated banking machine.Furthermore, the at least one fastener 440 is manually movable torelease the respective bezel 517 from fixed operatively supportedengagement with the bezel support structure 438.

The bezel fastener arrangements enable authorized service personnel torelatively readily remove a bezel and replace it with another bezel thathas a different configuration yet has similarly arranged fasteneraccepting openings. That is, the machine can be used with a plurality ofdifferently configured card reader bezels, where each bezel would sharethe same bezel support arrangement of the machine. The approach allows asingle automated banking machine to separately use differentlyconfigured card reader bezels without requiring any changes to themachine's bezel support structure. Different bezels can be attached inthe same manner to the same machine. In an example embodiment, anautomated transaction machine can individually use a plurality of cardreader bezels, with each bezel having an exterior surface of a different(unique) contoured profile, where the contoured profile surrounds thebezel's card slot. The differing contoured profiles are configured toreduce the probability of having a same type of fraudulent card readerbe attachable adjacent to different card slots of differently configuredcard reader bezels. The discussed approaches at a common supportingarrangement for plural bezels are example, and in other embodimentsother bezel support arrangements can be used.

In an example embodiment a card reader holder and gate assembly(generally indicated 438) is releasibly attachable to the card readerbezel 517 via the fasteners 440 which engage the fastener openings 442in the bezel. Gate assembly 438 includes a movable gate 444 which isoperative to block the slot 516 at the back of the bezel 517 when thecard reader mechanism within the machine is moved relatively away fromthe back of the bezel for servicing. The blocking by the gate 444 canprevent user cards from being inserted through the bezel slot 516 duringabsence of the card reader from the machine. Likewise, the gate 444 isoperative to move and open as the card reader assembly is operativelypositioned adjacent to the back (rear side) of the bezel 517. Of coursethese approaches are example and in other embodiments other approachescan be used.

FIG. 40 shows an alternative bezel fastening arrangement. A bezelincludes a bezel housing 446 and a bezel insert 448. The bezel insert448 includes a card reader slot 450 which enables a card to passtherethrough to a card reader 452. The bezel housing 446 is releasiblyengageable with bezel-supporting structure in the machine. The bezelinsert 448 is releasibly engageable with the bezel housing 446. Thus,both the bezel housing 446 and the bezel insert 448 can be supported bythe bezel-supporting structure. Some arrangements allow the bezel insertto be releasibly engaged with the bezel housing before they are attachedto the machine. In some embodiments a plurality of differentlyconfigured (and interchangeable) bezel inserts can be fittingly usedwith the same bezel housing. Thus, in some arrangements the bezelhousing can remain attached in the machine while the bezel insert isbeing replaced. That is, only the bezel insert would need to bereplaced. In other arrangements the bezel housing would first need to bedisconnected (unattached, unfastened) from the machine before the bezelinsert could be disconnected from the bezel housing. In otherembodiments a bezel housing and a corresponding bezel insert can only be(uniquely) fastened to each other. Thus, replacement of one wouldlikewise require replacement of the other.

Also, in some bezel arrangements both a bezel housing and a bezel insertcan be manually touchable by (tangible to) the machine user. Thisresults in both bezel components contributing to the bezel's outersurface configuration. Such a dual component surface configuration maycause additional interference against successful attachment of afraudulent reading device.

Suitable fasteners (e.g., like fasteners 440) and other features can beused to hold the bezel insert 448 in releasibly engaged relation withthe bezel housing 446. Some bezel arrangements may require that thefasteners be manually released only from the interior of the machine,which interior accessing may be performed by authorized servicepersonnel.

Fasteners are usable to fasten an interior support and a bezel or abezel housing. Fasteners are also usable to a fasten a bezel insert anda bezel housing. Such fasteners that are usable in bezel fastening caninclude bolts, screws, pins, hooks, recesses, male/female connections,flexible parts, telescopic components, snap fit pieces, etc. Also, abezel support structure may include at least one fastener integraltherewith. For example, the integral fastener can comprise a movablescrew or a snap fit connector. The snap fit connector can be removablyreceived in a connection slot of a bezel. Alternatively, a bezel canhave snap fit connectors that are removably fitted into connection slotsof a bezel support.

In another arrangement for securing a bezel, a key actuating type oflock can be used to fasten the bezel to a bezel support structure (e.g.,machine housing). The key lock can be arranged so that it is accessibleto a mechanical key that is used outside of the machine. Thus, theremovable bezel can be locked/unlocked to the housing by a serviceperson located outside of the machine. In still other arrangements, anexterior located key lock can be used in combination with a bezelfastener connection that is located inside the machine housing. As canbe appreciated, various approaches can be taken to provide differentconfigurations of bezel fastening so as to minimize the risk ofunauthorized removal of a bezel.

Different bezels can respectively have differently configured (orshaped) exterior (outer) faces. That is, the bezels' outer surfaces,which are touchable by customers, can have a shape vary with regard todimensions in height, length, and width. Different bezel shapes canrespectively have a different number and/or different positions ofindents, recesses, corners, curves, points, lengths, patterns, molds,forms, trims, contours, outlines, profiles, delineations,characteristics, frames, cutouts, peaks/valleys, physiques, rises,slopes, gradients, projections, angles, materials, colors, etc. Shapesother than donuts can also be used, including C-shapes, U shapes,L-shapes, I-shapes, T-shapes, V-shapes, X-shapes, rectangular shapes,unique shapes, etc.

The bezel 660 of FIG. 41 additionally has an outer contour comprisingfour was 682, 684, 686, 688 tapering inwardly to the card entry slot662. The upper 682 and lower 684 was each have three raised projections(upper projections 672, 674, 676; lower projections 692, 694, 696) thatextend away from the base of their wall face. The two side was 686, 688each have a single trapezoidal shaped outward extending raisedprojection 678, 680. The rise of the projections can vary in outwardheight. The intentional non-uniform outer surface assists in preventingskimmer attachment to the bezel 660.

In some example embodiments, bezels including card slots of differentdesigns can be readily changed on the same model of machine.Periodically changing bezel configurations may help to deter theinstallation of fraudulent reader components, such as data skimmingdevices. This is because criminals cannot readily develop skimmingdevices which can be attached without observation to a plurality ofdifferent configurations of bezels and card slots. Thus, by havingdifferent colors and contours of bezel designs, and by having machinesof the same type but with different card reader bezel configurations,criminals will find it more difficult to deploy and operate cardskimming devices. As can be seen, example embodiments increase thedifficulty of criminals to produce a generic skimming device that can beused on an entire (bank) fleet of machines, especially when machines ofthe same type (model) can respectively have different bezelconfigurations at different times.

The different bezel configurations can also have differently sized cardslots (e.g., slots of different widths). As previously discussed (e.g.,with regard to U.S. Provisional Application 61/574,594 filed Aug. 5,2011), some card slots (card input openings) can be of a larger(horizontal) width to allow a long edge (side) of a card to be insertedfirst into the card slot. That is, the card can be inserted sidewaysinto the slot. The card reader can be arranged so that a read head ishorizontally movable to read the magnetic stripe of the long-edgeinserted card. The card reader may be horizontally mounted. Inalternative card reading embodiments, a card reader may be verticallymounted to receive and read a card inserted vertically upward (ordownward) into a card slot, where the card slot can be of a widthconfigured to receive a long-edge inserted card.

FIGS. 30-39 show examples of example bezels which can be installed onautomated banking machine fascias. Each of these bezels has a differentexterior contour which makes it difficult to attach an unrecognizableskimming device. As can be appreciated, a sole skimming (fraudulent cardreading) device would be even further difficult to use with each of thedifferently configured bezels. As can be appreciated, each exampleincludes similar internal attachments mechanisms so that the bezels canbe interchanged and mounted in operative engagement with an exampleautomated banking machine fascia mounting structure. As furtherexpressed in FIGS. 30-39, each of these example bezels can include atranslucent donut of the type previously discussed that can be used forpurposes of detecting the installation of an authorized card readingdevice. Of course it should be understood that these bezelconfigurations are example and in other embodiments, otherconfigurations can be used.

FIG. 30 shows a card reader bezel 651, a receipt bezel 653, a keypadbezel 655, and a display bezel 657. FIG. 30 also shows a wireless readerbezel 659. The machine includes a wireless data reader which isoperatively positioned (within reading range) to wirelessly read userdata that is placed adjacent to the wireless reader bezel 659 by amachine user. As previously discussed, an automated banking machine canhave at least one wireless data reader that can wirelessly read smartcard chip data, RFID data, NFC data, magnetic data, IR data, and/or barcode data, etc. For example, a wireless NFC data reader of the machineis operable to read NFC data from a mobile phone (or card, wallet, etc.)that has engagingly contacted (e.g., bumped against) the wireless readerbezel 659. In another embodiment a RFID data reader of the machine canread RFID data from an object (phone, card, wallet, etc.) that ispositioned by a machine user within the reading range of the RFID datareader, which reading range includes the area adjacent the wirelessreader bezel. In still other embodiments a wireless biometric datareader of the machine can wirelessly read biometric data from a machineuser. For example, a biometric feature of the user can be read when thefeature is properly positioned near (or in contact with) the wirelessreader bezel. As previously discussed, a biometric feature that can bewirelessly read can include any of a fingerprint, ids scan, retina scan,facial feature, etc. When a camera is used as a wireless biometric datareader to read a facial feature of a machine user for use in facialrecognition, then the wireless reader bezel can bound (surround) avisual opening that leads from the fascia to the camera.

FIG. 31 is an isometric view of the card reader bezel 651 shown in FIG.30. FIGS. 31A, 31B, and 31C show different (angled) views of a card slotbezel that is similar to the bezel 651 shown in FIG. 31, but without thefastening member. Thus, for ease of understanding, the bezel in FIGS.31A, 31B, and 31C has been labeled like the bezel of FIG. 31. The bezel651 of FIG. 31 has a card entry area 661 that is tapered on four sides.The tapering guides the card to a card slot 663 that passes through thebezel. The card slot 663 has a continuous straight (horizontal) entryopening. Alternatively, the bezel 651 can be viewed as having a cardslot that includes the area 661, where the card slot tapers smallertoward the card reader. The FIG. 31 bezel comprises a fasteningarrangement which includes at least one fastening member 665.

FIGS. 32-39 respectively show differently configured card slot bezels902, 904, 906, 908, 910, 912, 914, and 916. Each of these respectivebezels includes at least one fastening (attaching) member that isuseable to removably attach the respective bezel to a machine. Fasteningmembers 903, 905,907,909,911,913,915, and 917 are shown. As can be seen,each of these fastening members has similarly arranged attachment points(e.g., fastener receiving holes) or connections (e.g., male/femalesnap-in connector component). The common usage of similarly configuredattachment points allows each bezel to be engagingly supported by thesame support structure of the machine. Thus, each of the differentlyconfigured bezels of FIGS. 32-39 can be interchangeably used with thesame automated banking machine.

FIGS. 32A-39A, 32B-39B, and 32C-39C respectively show different angledviews of card slot bezels that are similar to the respective bezelsshown in FIGS. 32-39, minus the bezel fastening members. That is, FIGS.32A, 32B, and 32C show different views of a bezel that is similar to thebezel shown in FIG. 32. Likewise, FIGS. 39A, 39B, and 39C show differentviews of a bezel that is similar to the bezel shown in FIG. 39. Thus,for ease of understanding, similar reference numerals have been used forsimilarly (like) configured (shaped) bezels.

As can be seen, an automated banking machine can have structure where abezel area surrounding a card reader slot can be readily replaced from aposition inside of the machine. Other arrangements can allow card readerbezel replacement from outside the machine, such as through use of afascia key lock. Still other bezel fastening arrangements can required aservice person to both access an outside securing feature and an insidesecuring feature of a bezel fastening arrangement. Further, the outsideand inside accessing may have to be performed in a specific order ofservice steps. For example, a first bezel securing feature which canonly be manually accessed inside of the machine housing may have to bereleased before another (second) bezel securing feature which isaccessible outside of the machine housing can be released, and viceversa. Thus, the fastening and/or removing of a bezel may require thatthe authorized person perform (in a particular sequential order) bothinterior an exterior operations.

As discussed, an outer surface of a bezel area can include one or morediagonal faces, including faces of different (outwardly extending)heights. For example, the faces can slope or taper in an inwardlydirection toward the card slot. Thus, a bezel configuration can act toguide (or funnel) a card toward the card entry slot. As discussed,example embodiments allow for different card reading area bezels withdifferent configurations to be installed and periodically changed ondifferent machines.

In other example embodiments an interchangeable integral bezel unit canhave a translucent or transparent view window. The window is of aconfiguration (size) and position (location) that allows a customer toview their card while it is inside the card reader. Thus, the customercan be in visual possession of their card at all times during atransaction with the machine. An inability of a customer to see theircard can be an indication that an unauthorized component is blockingtheir (direct line of sight) view to the card. FIG. 42 shows a bezelunit 700 including card slot 702 and a (transparent or translucent)window 704. FIG. 43 shows a card reader 800, which has a shutter 802 andan open top portion 804. At least one read head 806 and card sensors 808are also shown. The shutter 802 is aligned with the slot 702. The window704 allows a customer to see into the interior of the reader 800.

The card reader's entrance shutter (door) 802 can be moved from a closedposition (or a locked condition) to an open position (or an unlockedcondition) to allow a user card to enter into the interior of the cardreader 800. In an example embodiment the shutter 802 is normally lockedin a closed position to keep non card material out of the card reader.With the shutter 802 unlocked during a card reading operation, a cardentering the card reader pushes against the biased shutter 802 causingit to be moved to an open position. For example, the shutter 802 can bepivoted upward about an upper hinge or axis. Upon exit of the card fromthe card reader, the shutter 802 is biased back to its closed positionwhere it can again be placed in a locked condition. It should also beunderstood that other arrangements for opening/closing a shutter canalso be used, including arrangements that use drive (e.g., mechanical,electrical, etc.) devices to cause the shutter to be moved (driven) fromthe closed position to an open position independent of card insertion.

In other example embodiments, operation of a shutter of a card reader islinked to one or more visual indicators situated on the bezel (or on thefascia). The bezel has at least one sensor positioned in an areaadjacent to (or in) the card input slot. The at least one sensor cansense the presence of a card entering the card slot. The at least onesensor can also sense whether the card is properly oriented to allowreading of the card data (e.g., magnetic stripe data) by the cardreader. Both the at least one sensor and the shutter position/conditioncontrolling device can be in operative connection with at least oneprocessor (e.g., controller) of the machine.

The magnetic stripe of a card can be used to determine the card'sorientation. For example, if a magnetic property of a magnetic stripecan be sensed (by the at least one sensor), then it is determined thatthe card is correctly oriented. That is, the at least one sensor can bepositioned relative to the card entry slot so that it can only read amagnetic property from a properly oriented magnetic stripe.

A visual indicator (e.g., a light emitter which can change colors) onthe bezel (or on the fascia) can alert a customer whether their card wascorrectly or incorrectly inserted. For example, a visual indicatorcomprising an LED can emit a green light if the card was determined tobe properly oriented upon its entry into (or adjacent to) the card inputslot. In response to the (magnetic) sensing of a properly oriented card,the shutter can be opened to allow the card to enter the card reader. Incontrast, the LED can emit a red light if a sensed card is determined tobe improperly oriented. The shutter will remain closed in response tothe sensing of an improperly oriented card.

As can be seen, an example embodiments allow for use of shutter lockingcontrol in combination with visual indicators during a machinetransaction. The computer control that oversees the unlocking of thecard reader shutter is dependent on verification that the card iscorrectly oriented. Furthermore, visual indicators (e.g., LEDs) can beused to identify (confirm) to a customer an authenticated proper cardorientation.

The bezel unit of FIG. 42 also includes a visual indicator 706 and atleast one sensor 708 operable to both sense the presence of a card andsense a magnetic property. In an example the at least one sensorincludes two sensors, both a separate proximity sensor and a separatemagnetic field sensor. In another example the at least one sensorcomprises a single combination sensor. It should be understood that inother example examples more or fewer sensors can be used.

It should also be understood that a card reader shutter arrangement thatis (at least partly) controlled by bezel sensor operation is applicableto both short-edge and long-edge card insertion configurations. In thebezel example of FIG. 42 the at least one sensor 708 is positionedadjacent to a lower (bottom) edge of the slot 702. This position allowsthe at least one sensor to detect a proper orientation for a card thatis being inserted short-edge first, has its magnetic stripe facingdownward, and has its magnetic stripe at the lower right side of thecard. The proper orientation enables the right side read head 806 inFIG. 43 to read data from the magnetic stripe. However, the at least onesensor shown in FIG. 42 may also be viewed as being positioned to detecta proper orientation for a card that is being inserted long-edge firstand has its magnetic stripe facing downward. It should be understoodthat the sensor position is example, and in other embodiments othersensor positions can be used.

Further, in some example embodiments authorized bezels can have embeddedtherein at least one indicator that can comprise radio frequencyidentification (RFID) tags, near field communication (NFC) chips, and/orother wired or wireless indicators which can be detected throughoperation of suitable sensors positioned within the machine. FIG. 29shows a bezel indicator 456. For example, a bezel indicator can comprisean RFID tag which indicates that the bezel is a genuine and authorizedbezel. The data in the RFID tag may include a suitable serial number orother data or value which indicates to the machine that an authorizedbezel is present.

As discussed in further detail later, in some arrangements a bezels'sRFID tag is programmable, and the machine is operable to store bezelupdated data in the RFID tag of an authorized bezel. The stored bezeldata can be later read by the machine's RFD reader to verify that anauthorized bezel is still present. Updating of bezel data may occurafter each transaction. Similarly, the machine may store authorizationdata in a programmable NFC chip of a bezel. A new bezel being attachedto the machine for the first time can have bezel data that identifies itto a machine-associated computer as a bezel that is designated(approved) for use with the machine.

In an example embodiment, at least one bezel indicator reader (orsensor) is positioned within (or adjacent to) the machine. A reader of abezel indicator can comprise a wireless reader. FIG. 3 shows such awireless reader 77. The wireless reader 77 is operable to wirelesslyreceive bezel data transmitted by a bezel positioned adjacent themachine housing. For example, the bezel data can be usable to identifythe bezel as a bezel authorized for use with the machine.

The bezel data reader 77 can comprise an RFID reader and/or an NFCreader. For example, an RFID reader can detect signals from a RFID tagor other RFID indicator on or in the bezel. The presence of anappropriate bezel data (or indicator) may be monitored through operationof at least one computer associated with the machine to assure that anauthorized bezel is installed on a machine. Thus, removal of a bezel canbe detected.

Alternatively, an RFID signal strength or other signal properties may beused by at least one computer to determine that an authorized bezel isadjacent the machine housing, and it is also in its proper operatinglocation. The failure to detect an authorized bezel may be indicativethat an unauthorized bezel has been installed by criminals on themachine. Likewise, a failure to detect appropriate signal strength orother properties can be an indication that a skimming device isinstalled. That is, a change in the signal strength from an RFD tag (orfrom an NFC chip) can be an indication of tampering. For example, thesignal strength may be decreased because of the new presence ofunauthorized structure. The signal strength may also be decreasedbecause the bezel is not properly positioned (e.g., due to unauthorizedmovement of the bezel from its normal operating position). Signalstrength may also be decreased (or absent) because the current bezel isunauthorized (e.g., due to unauthorized replacement of the prior bezel).

In response to the detection arrangement indicating the absence of theexpected bezel indicator, or improper signal properties, the at leastone processor can operate in accordance with its programming to takeappropriate action. This can include, for example, disabling furtheroperation of the machine, giving an indication to a remote computer of apossible fraud condition, notifying authorities, causing a displaydevice to output a message (warning) to potential customers, and/orother appropriate steps.

In alternative embodiments, a bezel indicator can include a programmableRFD tag or other structure/component which can receive signals(messages), such as from the machine. The indicator can alter its storeddata in response to the messages from the machine. For example, a bezelindicator's programmable RFID tag (or a similar wireless indicatorincluding a memory) may receive data (such as from the machine), whichis then stored in association with the indicator. This data may beoutput (sent) by a suitable wireless output device of the machine witheach transaction, or upon other events that occur at the machine. Thatis, with each transaction the current data being stored by the indicatorcan be updated. For example, after a transaction the machine may providethe bezel indicator new data that corresponds to a code or value, suchas the next transaction number or identifier.

The machine includes at least one wireless reader (e.g., as RFID tagreader) that can read data from the bezel's stored data (e.g., an RFIDtag). The machine can operate in accordance with its programming tocheck the data stored in connection with the bezel indicator with eachtransaction or on a periodic basis. That is, a computer associated withthe machine can determine if the bezel's currently stored data matchesthe latest data sent to the bezel. If the stored data associated withthe bezel indicator does not correspond with the data that was last sentby the machine to be stored in the bezel indicator, then at least oneprocessor of the machine will determine this discrepancy. The processorof the machine can further resolve that there is a possible fraudsituation occurring at the machine. This may result in the processorcausing the machine to no longer operate or to give an indication of afraud condition to a remote computer.

Further in other embodiments, security features (such as dataencryption) can be used in association with the transmission of datato/from the indicator and with data storage to make it more difficult tointercept and replicate the data used in association with the indicator.This can include, for example, the use of public key encryption orsimilar security so as to assure that communications between anemitter/receiver of the machine and the storage device of (within) theindicator cannot be intercepted or readily replicated in a counterfeitbezel device. Of course these approaches are example and in otherembodiments other approaches can be used.

Furthermore, each of the bezel configurations previously discussed canbe used with bezel indicators of the type described to assure that thereplaceable/changeable bezels installed on a machine are authorized, andthat a counterfeit bezel has not been installed on the machine. As canbe seen, example arrangements allow for a feature to be associated witha replaceable authorized bezel in order to determine if the authorizedbezel has been removed and replaced with another (fraudulent) bezelinstalled by the a criminal. An example system of this type can involvea series of sensors or other switches that can detect when the bezel hasbeen removed from its normal surroundings. If a processor (associatedwith the sensors) determines a situation where the bezel has beenchanged, then the machine may be automatically shutdown. A machineservicer may need to provide special inputs to the shutdown machine,cause a message to be downloaded to the machine, or other procedures inorder to again make the machine operable for customers.

As can be seen, example examples of sophisticated approaches fordetermining if the authorized bezel has been removed have been provided.For example, some of these approaches include providing programmable RFDtags or other chips within the authorized bezel. An RFID receiver/readerwithin the machine can determine if the data output by the RFD tag inthe bezel corresponds to a value for an authorized bezel (i.e., a bezelauthorized to be used with that particular machine). As previouslydiscussed, the machine itself (or a processor associated therewith) canbe used to provide the bezel with an updated value.

Other approaches for authorized bezel verification may analyze signalstrength to verify that the bezel is in its proper (expected) position.This can include analyzing the signal strength received by the(remainder of the) machine from an RFID tag or NFC chip embedded in thebezel. If the authorized bezel has been moved from its normal positionbut still remains within the machine, then the change (e.g., decrease)in the signal strength can be an indicator that the authorized bezel isnot in the proper operating position. As a result, changes in the sensedsignal from the RFD tag (or NFC chip) can be an indication that thebezel has been moved from its authorized position, and that criminalshave installed a skimming bezel on the machine.

As previously discussed, other detection methods for detecting thepresence of an unauthorized bezel can also be implemented. These caninclude having an RF emitter transmitter of the machine communicate withthe programmable RFID component (or NFC chip) of a given bezel withevery transaction. The communication can cause the RFID tag to store adifferent value (or secret code) after completion of each transaction.Before allowing the machine to carry out a subsequent transaction, theprocessor/sensors associated with the machine can determine if themachine can receive (from the bezel) the prior value that wascommunicated to the RFID tag. If the value does not correspond (match),or cannot be recovered (received from the bezel), then a fraud conditionthat the bezel has been replaced with an unauthorized bezel can bedetermined.

As previously discussed, encryption features can be employed inconnection with the communicating and storing of data within a datastore associated with the RFID tag or NFC chip of the bezel. Thus, thedata stored in the bezel data store (e.g., RFID tag) may be encrypted tomake it harder for criminals to produce counterfeit bezels to install onmachines. Example encrypted communication approaches can use asymmetricpublic key encryption for purposes of transmitting a new value to thebezel. This can include having a data store in association with the RFIDtag (or NFC chip) in the bezel. The data store can have a public andprivate key. Similarly, the processor associated with the machine's RFIDreader and transmitter can have its own public and private key pair. Themachine's emitter can communicate wirelessly to the bezel its publickey, and cause the bezel to provide its public key to the machine'sprocessor. A value that is encrypted using a given private key can bedecrypted using the corresponding public key. Thus, the ATM is able todetermine that it is communicating with the genuine bezel. Likewise, thegenuine bezel is able to determine that it is communicating with theauthorized emitter and processor associated with the machine. In thisexample arrangement, data can be securely stored within the data storeof the bezel that can authenticate the particular bezel as genuine.

In still other embodiments, card reader bezel structures can be madefurther resistant to fraud by having movable components included thereinor therewith. For example, bezels may be comprised of flexible plasticor other material that allow the flexing and movement of surfacesthereof. Such flexible materials can include embedded therein or mountedadjacent thereto, movable members which are in operative connection withactuators so as to provide periodic movement of the bezel structures.Such movement may be achieved by actuating devices, such as shape memoryahoy structures that move in response to applied electrical energy.Alternatively, such bezel structures may move in response to appliedpressure, such as internal fluid (air) bladders, pneumatic cylinders, orother similar pressure providing devices. Further, alternativeembodiments may include panels or pieces that are moved in response tosolenoid actuators, motors, or other electrical devices.

In an example embodiment, control circuitry can operate in response toat least one processor in the machine to cause the periodic movement ofthe actuator included within the card reader bezel (or other machinebezel that is used to receive user input). Movement of the actuatorchanges the exterior contour of the bezel. Changing of the exteriorcontour will generally cause the dislodgement of (or the readily visiblyexposing of) an unauthorized reading device that may have been mountedthereon by a criminal. In example embodiments the exterior surface ofthe bezel's contour adjacent to the area of the donut can beperiodically moved in response to the actuator. Such movement caninclude, for example, producing a periodic single temporary bulge orwave in the outer surface contour of the bezel. In some exampleembodiments, a plurality of such temporary bulges, waves, or othercontour changes can be produced. The outward waves can also be ofvarious sizes (wavelengths and frequencies) and can be continuallyproduced for various lengths of time. Such contour changes can beproduced (before and/or after) each time that the user data readingdevice (e.g., a card reader) is operated, at other periodic intervals,after proximity detection of a potential customer, etc.

As can be appreciated, such repeated periodic contour surface changeswill generally be effective, particularly in areas where skimmers arelikely to be attached, to cause such skimmers to (at least partly) bedisengaged or dislodged from the moving underlying bezel structure.Thus, such skimmers will be made more readily visibly apparent tomachine users and machine owners. Furthermore, when combined with theuse of anti-stick coatings (of the types previously discussed), the useof bezels having changeable outer contour surfaces will be furthereffective to prevent the continual (retained) attachment of unauthorizeddevices thereto. Of course these approaches are example and in otherembodiments, other approaches can be used.

Still other example embodiments can change the presented outer surfaceof a bezel by movement of individual bezel components. For example, abezel can have plural different faces. The bezel can be rotated about anaxis by a service person to change the bezel face that is to becurrently presented to the machine users. FIG. 44 shows a top view of abox shaped bezel section 810 having four differently configured(substantially square or rectangular) outer faces 812, 814, 816, 818.The bezel section 810 can be moved (rotated) ninety degrees about itsaxis 828 to cause an adjacent (next) face to be presented to a customerarea adjacent the machine. FIG. 45 shows an angled side view of thebezel section shown in FIG. 44. Some fixed protrusions 820, 822 that arecommon to both Figures are also shown.

In an example embodiment a bezel comprises both an upper section and alower section. These two sections are independently rotatable. Thearrangement allows for an upper section of one complete bezel face to beused (mixed and/or matched) with the lower section of another completebezel face. Thus, the arrangement enables the generation of even moredifferent combinations (configurations) of usable bezel faces. As shownin FIG. 45, each of the four sides 812, 814, 816, 818 of the upper bezelsection 810 can include a cutout 824, 826 that comprises one-half of the(total area of the) card slot. In other arrangements one of the upper orlower bezel sections can have a cutout that forms substantially theentire slot. A cutout can also be a portion (percentage) that is lessthan half of a slot.

FIG. 46 shows a top view of another multi-faced upper bezel section 830.The triangular shaped section has three differently configured outerfaces 832, 834, 836. The bezel section 830 can be rotated (in eitherdirection) 120° degrees about its axis 838 to cause a different face tobe presented to a customer. A drive device 840 can be used to performthe rotation. FIG. 47 shows an angled side view of the bezel section 830shown in FIG. 46. Protruding outward from the face 832 are two parallelvertically-extending raised members 842, 844. The face 832 also has aslot cutout portion 846. A raised member 848 extending from face 834 isalso shown in both Figures.

In an example arrangement a key lock is used to hold a bezel (or a bezelsection) of a transaction machine in its desired rotational position.The key lock can be positioned inside the machine. Alternatively, thekey lock can be positioned so that it is accessible from the front(exterior) customer side of the machine. Thus, a bank employee who dailyadds cash to the machine can also daily manually rotate the bezel to anew position. An unlocked rotatable bezel can also be easily removed andreplaced (exchanged) by the bank employee. This allows for use of aplurality of multi-faced bezels, where no two faces are the same. Inother arrangements, a machine computer can cause a multi-faced bezel tobe rotated (by a computer controlled drive) to a new face immediatelyfollowing each transaction. The rotation (and the time of rotation) canbe predetermined to follow a set rotational pattern. Alternatively, theamount of rotations for any single face change can be randomlydetermined. As can be seen, bezel movement (or movement of a portion ofa bezel) such as by rotation or pivoting, provides increased protectionagainst successful fraudulent device installation and operation.

FIG. 48 shows a front view of another example bezel 850. The bezel 850includes a plurality of outwardly extendable projections 852, 854, 856,858. A card reader entry slot 860 is also shown. A bezel's pattern ofprojections can be based on several variables, including the number ofprojections being used versus the effectiveness of the pattern. Forexample, it may not be cost effective to cover an entire bezel face inclosely spaced projections. An example embodiment includes a computerprogram that can calculate effective different patterns of movable facemembers (projections) based on changeable factors such as configuration(e.g., security contributing angles) of the bezel face, the bezel facematerial (e.g., strength, thermal expansion properties, etc.), bezelsize, other security features employed (e.g., non-stick coating),climate, assessment of fraud risk for the intended geographic location,cost, etc.

FIG. 49 shows a side view of an upper portion of the bezel 850 takenalong A-A in FIG. 48. The upper portion includes the projections 852,854 located above the card slot 860. In FIG. 49 the projections 852, 854are in their non-extended (flush) position. FIG. 50 also shows a sideview of an upper portion of the bezel 850 taken along A-A in FIG. 48.However, in contrast to FIG. 49, the projections 852, 854 in FIG. 50 arein a fully extended position. That is, the outer surface of theprojections 852, 854 can be moved from a position (FIG. 49) that issubstantially flush with the bezel face to another position (FIG. 50)that is extended outward a predetermined distance from (relative to) thebezel face. The card entry slot 860 is also shown in the FIGS. 49 and50.

In an example embodiment an electric motor 862 drives a screw rod 864connected to a plate 866. The plate 866 connects to the projections. Themotor 862 can be operated to move the projections outward and inwardrelative to their guide housings 868. The fixed housings 868 eachinclude at least one slot through which the plate 866 can respectivelymove. In one example embodiment all of the projections (including thoselocated above and below the card slot 860) are connected to the plate866 and driven by a drive device (e.g., motor). In other exampleembodiments all projections located above the card slot are operativelyconnected to a first plate and a first drive device, whereas allprojections located below the card slot are operatively connected to asecond plate and a second drive device.

It should be understood that other arrangements for operativelyconnecting a plurality of projections (or a single projection) to adrive device can be used. It should also be understood that other drivedevices and/or arrangements can be used to cause the projections to bemoved (driven) in an outward direction (toward a customer area). Forexample, a mechanical, electrical, electro mechanical, fluid, ormagnetic drive member can be used. Biasing arrangements can also be usedto move (push or pull) the bezel face components (projections) eitheroutward or inward.

An example embodiments also allow for changing the distance whichcertain movable surface portions (projections) are outwardly moved. Thatis, the projecting distance can be periodically varied. Some movableportions may be moved only part of their maximum distance, whereas othermovable portions may simultaneously be moved their maximum distance. Ascan be appreciated, the varying of outward movement results in differentbezel face configurations.

By periodically changing the outer contour of a bezel face, an attachedfraudulent device (such as a card skimmer) may become dislodged from thebezel surface. Alternatively, a changed contour may cause a skimmer tobe rearranged so that the skimmer becomes more noticeable, eithervisually by a person or by machine sensors or cameras. The novel abilityto outwardly/inwardly move bezel portions allows for machine computerprogramming to cause a different facial configuration to occur afterevery customer transaction session.

In other example embodiments a bezel includes a display screen device. Acomputer associated with the automated banking machine controls the datathat is output by the bezel display. For example, the outputted data cancomprise data that a potential machine user can verify as correct, suchas the current time and/or date, bank name, bank branch address, etc.

The data output through the bezel display screen can also be correlatedby a computer with information this is concurrently output through the(larger) user display screen, such as the user display screen 36 shownin FIG. 1. For example, the user display screen may notify the potentialmachine user to check whether the bezel display is currently displayinga specific code. That is, for normal operation the specific code isvisible (or indicated or identified) on both the user display and thebezel display. The absence of the code on the bezel display, or aninability of the potential user to see the code on the bezel display,can be an indication of the presence of a (view blocking) card skimmeror an unauthorized bezel. The code can be predetermined or randomlygenerated. A new code or password can be provided after eachtransaction. The sophisticated computer programming that causes the twodisplays to simultaneously output the same code would act as anotherdeterrent to success of a fraud device attached to the machine.

In other embodiments other (non identical) data can be correlated. Forexample, the user display can be used to inform a person (via adisplayed text message) to verify that the correct date/time isdisplayed on the bezel display before inserting their card into a cardslot.

In another example the bezel can have an indicator (e.g., an indicatorlight such as an LED). The indicator can be in addition to oralternative to the bezel display. The machine can cause a plurality ofdifferent colors to be individually output by the bezel's indicator. Thecolor being output through the indicator should be visible to acustomer. The user display can then ask a person to verify whether aspecific color is being output by the bezel indicator.

In still other embodiments card entry into a valid card slot can benormally blocked by the machine. The potential machine user may berequired to verify through user input (e.g., to a touch screen userdisplay) that the accessible card slot is closed. For example, themachine can (via displayed instructions) request the user to try toinsert only a non-stripe portion of their upside down card into theaccessible card dot (which may be a fraudulent slot). The potentialmachine user may also be required to verify other data, such that thecurrent date/time is correct and/or that the displayed codes match.Following user input corresponding to the required verifications, thecard slot can then be opened (unblocked) by the machine. The user canthen insert their card into the deemed-valid card slot to enable readingof user data from the card, it should be understood that combinations ofarrangements involved with customer validation of the accessible(visible) card slot can be used. A plurality of validation steps can beconducted and/or required by the machine. Additionally, the combinationsand arrangements are also applicable to customer validation of otherreading devices (e.g., a biometric reader).

As previously discussed, a bezel can be positioned in an area relativelyclose to a card reader of an automated banking machine. In anotherexample embodiment an outer surface portion of the bezel can comprise aflexible material, such as plastic or rubber. An actuator can beoperated to cause the contour of the flexible outer surface of the bezelto be changed. The actuator can be mounted on the bezel. Alternatively,the actuator can be mounted in the machine at a location adjacent to thebezel.

Suitable driving circuitry can move the actuator so that the outercontour of an outer surface of the bezel is physically changed. Thechange can be temporarily, with the flexible material returning to itsoriginal shape (e.g., its shape prior to being flexed). By periodicallychanging an outer surface portion of a bezel, a skimmer that wasattached to the bezel outer surface portion may be dislodged. Thus, theability of example bezels to have their external form modified byflexing can also assist in reducing fraud at automated banking machines.

An outer surface portion of the bezel can also comprise othershape-changing materials, such as shape memory alloys, piezoelectrics,electroactive polymers (EPAs), superelastic carbon nanotube aerogel,etc. Additional materials can include Mylar®, etc. Flexible elasticpackaging materials may also be used. The materials may also be coveredby a loose layer of a protective stronger material, such as Kevlar®.Combinations of materials are also useable.

In an example embodiment a flexible outer skin portion (e.g., a flexibleplastic or rubber portion) of a bezel can be expanded/contracted throughoperation of an actuator that provides an increase/decrease in pressureapplied against the portion. For example, air may be added to a sealedchamber to provide the increase in pressure. The chamber can act as abellows or baffle. The baffle can have separate chambers thatsequentially expand to cause a wave (or ripple) effect on the flexiblematerial (skin) of a bezel. Alternatively, a drive piston may be used toforce cylinder fluid (e.g., liquid, air) against the flexible material.

FIG. 51 shows an example of a bezel 870 with its outer skin 872 expandedby fluid pressure from an air-providing (pneumatic) actuator 874. Theskin (which can have a balloon like expanding property) is inflated bythe increased air pressure. As shown in FIG. 52 the continuous sealedskin 872 surrounds the card slot 876 of the bezel 870. Thus, a singleactuator can be used to change the shape of the bezel's outer surfaceboth above and below the card slot 876. In other embodiments pluralactuators can be used to respectively inflate separately segregated(independent) sealed partial sections of the total outer skin surface.

In other example embodiments a movable member may be mechanically slidor rolled against the flexible (elastic) bezel outer surface to push(stretch) the bezel skin in an outward direction (e.g., toward thecustomer area). For example, a roller (or ball) can have an outersurface that extends further outward than the face of the skin when theroller is rolled (horizontally) across the skin. The movement of the(outwardly pushing) roller causes a wave (of expansion and contraction)to move across the skin. That is, the wave is at its peak where theroller contacts (and pushes outward) the skin. As the roller continuesto move, the peak correspondingly continues to move. Thus, the movingroller creates a moving wave. The skin at a specific skin area returns(flexes back) to its normal (non stretched) condition after the rollerhas passed that specific skin area.

FIG. 53 shows an example of an example wave-creating arrangementapplicable to a bezel surface. A cylindrical roller 880 is used to applya pressure force against the interior side of a bezel skin 882. Anangled side view of the roller 880 is shown in FIG. 54. As can be seen,as the roller 880 horizontally moves (in a direction of the arrow)across the flexible skin 882 it creates an outwardly directed wave 884at the point of contact. In an example embodiment the roller 880 isattached to a slide housing 886 that slides on at least one rail 888.The housing 886 can be pushed, pulled, or driven along the rail 888. Atleast one biasing component 890 (e.g., a spring) acts to push the roller880 away from the housing 886 in a direction toward the skin 882. Endramps 892 can be used to keep the roller 880 positioned inward (againstthe spring force) toward the housing 886 when a wave run is completed.In other example embodiments the force pushing the roller 880 outward(toward the skin) can be provided through use of a conventional drivemember (e.g., screws, motors, magnets, etc.), which can then act torelease/remove the applied force.

In still other example embodiments, the surface contours (includingsurface angles) of a bezel body structure can be such that users of themachine are forced to insert cards into the card slot in particular(intended) ways. For example, bezel structures can be configured so asto make it highly awkward for a machine user to insert the card usinganything other than their right hand. Implementing this bezelconfiguration provides predictability regarding the areas adjacent thefascia in which a user's hand will be positioned when inserting a cardinto the machine. By forcing the use of the right hand of the user forcard insertion, this also indicates where the hand structure will bepositioned during normal machine/user operation.

In example embodiments, radiation or other types of detectors of thetypes previously discussed are operative in conjunction with one or moresuitably programmed processors to detect the presence of the user's handadjacent thereto. Further, sensors located in other areas of the fasciawhere a user's hand would not normally be positioned may be used todetect conditions which correspond to a current attempt to install anunauthorized card reading device.

A bezel configuration can have a particular recessed area that leads tothe card slot. Thus, because a user is required to manually insert theirhand/fingers into the recessed area during insertion of their card intothe card slot, the configuration generally assures that the user's (cardgripping) hand/fingers will not be positioned in/at a different area ofthe bezel that is located away from the recessed area during cardinsertion/removal. For example, this different area of the bezel may beoutwardly located from the (normal) card slot. Thus, detecting cardinsertion without sensing that a hand was moved into the recessed area(e.g., moved in expected close proximity to the card slot) during thecard insertion can be an indication that a fraud device was presentbetween the hand and the (normal) card slot during the card insertion.

Card insertion may be based on proximity sensors which detect thepresence of the card in the card slot. Card insertion may also be basedon magnetic stripe detection. For example, in circumstances where themagnetic stripe of a card is detected, sensors of the type previouslydescribed can be operative to sense the presence of structures that areadjacent the slot and outside of the normal area where the user's handwould be expected to be positioned. Thus the sensing of structures inthese areas can be analyzed to more reliably provide an indication of anabnormal condition, such as the installation of a skimmer. This can bedone in the manner previously discussed or using other types of sensors.

In other embodiments, a user's card (or magnetic stripe thereof) can bedetected while it is still located exterior of the bezel's (handreceiving) recessed area. At the approximate time of this carddetection, sensing of structure adjacent the card slot or in therecessed area can also be indicative of the structure beingunauthorized. That is, if the card is not yet in the recessed area (oradjacent the card slot), then the user's hand also would not yet be inthe recessed area.

When conditions corresponding to the installation of a skimmer aredetected, appropriate steps can be taken, such as ceasing operation ofthe machine, sending messages to a remote security computer, and thelike. It should be understood that the approach of configuring the bezelso that a user's particular hand and fingers are generally forced to bepositioned in a particular location and not in another location wheninserting or removing a card from the slot, is example of approachesthat can be taken to facilitate the detection of the presence ofunauthorized reading devices. In other embodiments, other approaches canbe used.

In still other embodiments, automated banking machines can be operativeto detect conditions where criminals may have tampered with the machineso as to install unauthorized user input interception devices. FIG. 55shows a portion of a machine fascia generally indicated 647 whichincludes the machine keypad 638. Keypad 638 may be of the typepreviously discussed and includes a plurality of keys 636. In an exampleembodiment the keys of the keypad are positioned generally inwardlyrelative to a front surface of the fascia 632.

In an example embodiment, pockets 650 are positioned in the fasciaportion on each side of the keypad. Pockets 650 of an example embodimentinclude recesses which are adapted to engage leg portions 644 of akeypad cover 640. In an example embodiment the pockets are configured tohold/receive adhesive or other suitable material for engaging the legportions 644 of the keypad cover 640 to the fascia portion 647.Alternatively, the pockets can receive mechanical connectors/fastenersfor securing the leg portions 644 to the fascia portion 647. Of coursethese approaches are example, and in other embodiments other approachesmay be used.

In an example embodiment the attached keypad cover 640 is configured toextend generally above the keypad so as to prevent the unauthorizedobservation of inputs therethrough by criminals, either directly (e.g.,direct line of sight) or indirectly such as through the use of miniaturecameras installed in an area adjacent the machine. FIG. 56 shows thekeypad cover 640 installed to the fascia portion 647. That is, FIG. 55shows a potentially fraud condition in which the keypad cover has beenremoved, whereas FIG. 56 shows a fascia operating condition in which thekeypad cover is installed in its proper (normal) position overlying thekeypad. Of course FIG. 55 can also be viewed as condition where thekeypad cover has not yet been installed to the fascia portion.

The example keypad cover 640 includes a body 630 which is generallycomprised of a flexible resilient material. The body 630 includes a pairof inward extending sidewalls 642. The upper portion of the keypad coverincludes an opening 634. The opening 634 is generally configured toenable viewing of the keys of the keypad by a user positioned adjacentto the machine.

In an example embodiment, a user is able to extend their fingers intothe attached keypad cover to engage the keys of the keypad whilesimultaneously visually observing the location of the keys so as toprovide the desired finger inputs. The body 630 of the keypad cover 640can be comprised of resilient material having a resilient nature thatallows flexing of the cover to accommodate the movement of the user'shand therein. Thus, the resilient material facilitates the user'sengagement with the keys. These approaches are example, and in otherembodiments other approaches may be used.

In order to provide enhanced security, some example embodiments includesensors that are operable to determine if the keypad cover 640 has beenremoved from its area above the keypad. This condition is determinedbecause criminals who may wish to install a false keypad overlay oftencannot install such a overlay with the keypad cover in place. In exampleembodiments, one or more sensors 458 are installed adjacent one or moreof the pockets 650 positioned on each side of the keypad. The sensors458 are able to detect properties that are indicative of whether thekeypad cover 640 has been removed relative to the sensors or pockets. Insome example embodiments, the sensors 458 may include a photosensor,infrared sensor, ultrasonic sensor, contact sensor, and/or anothersuitable sensor that is operative to sense a change in conditions if theadjacent leg portion 644 is no longer in adjacent relation thereto.

In an example embodiment the sensors 458 are in operative connectionwith suitable interface circuitry 460 which operates to receive signalsfrom the sensors. The interface circuitry 460 provides one or moreoutputs to circuitry that includes at least one processor 462. The atleast one processor 462 includes associated programming therein that isoperative to analyze signals representative of the conditions detectedby the at least one keypad cover sensor 458. The processor 462 isoperative to determine when the signals correspond to a change which isindicative of removal of the keypad cover 640. Upon determining thatsuch a removal has occurred, the at least one processor/circuitry 462operates to send at least one message to a terminal controller 464. Theterminal controller is operative to take steps in accordance with itsprogramming, like those previously discussed. Such steps may include,for example, operating to cause the machine to no longer operate toperform transactions. Alternatively or in addition, the terminalcontroller 464 may operate to send one or more notification (alert)messages to a remote computer so as to notify bank personnel, lawenforcement, or other individuals that potential tampering with themachine has occurred.

In other example embodiments, one or more sensors 646 may be positionedgenerally beneath the keypad cover. Sensor 646 is in operativeconnection with suitable interface circuitry 466 that receives thesignals from the sensor so as to evaluate signals received therefrom. Inexample embodiments, the sensor 646 may include an infrared sensor thatincludes an emitter and receiver, and is operative to sense a distanceto an interior surface of the keypad cover. Such a sensor may beoperative in conjunction with interface circuitry 466 to determine thedistance to an interior surface of the overlying keypad cover 640. Thus,for example, if the keypad cover has been removed, there will generallybe no overlying surface sensed, especially at the expected distancebased on a prior distance determination. This cover-removed conditioncan be determined through operation of at least one processor, such asprocessor 462.

Furthermore, if an unauthorized overlay has been positioned above thekeypad (regardless of whether the keypad cover is present or absent),then the total distance sensed by the at least one sensor 646 will besmall and/or reduced relative to a prior distance reading (i.e., theexpected distance). As a result, such detected changes can also beidentified as corresponding to a possible fraud condition.

In an example embodiment, signals from the at least one sensor 646 areanalyzed through operation of interface circuitry. In an exampleembodiment the interface circuitry 462, which includes at least oneprocessor, is combined with the interface circuitry 460 associated withsensor 458. However, it should be understood that in other embodimentsseparate interface circuitry and processors may be provided foranalyzing signals from the various sensors 458, 646 that may be used forsensing possible fraud conditions.

As previously discussed, the at least one processor of the interfacecircuitry 462 can also be used to detect when signals corresponding toconditions sensed by at least one sensor 646 correspond to eitherremoval of the keypad cover and/or the installation of an overlyingkeypad overlay. Responsive to such a risk determination, the processorof circuitry 462 is operative to send an indication thereof to theterminal controller 464.

The terminal controller 464 interfaces with the circuitry 462 so thatanalysis for potential fraud conditions is done at times when a user'sfingers should not be in a position to be sensed within the keypadcover. This may include, for example, times when no transaction is beingconducted at the machine.

In other embodiments, at least one sensor 646 may include an inductancesensor which may work in conjunction with the other connected circuitryto sense a change in inductance in an area of the keypad cover. Such achange can be indicative of keypad cover removal. Alternatively or inaddition, such a change in inductance may correspond to the installationof an overlay so as to intercept PIN inputs. The inductance sensingarrangement can allow for a user's member being within the keypad coverto be taken into consideration.

As can be seen, various example embodiments have been provided for usingsensors to sense the removal of a keypad cover. These embodimentsinclude situating sensors in the (two) leg areas where the keypad coverlegs respectively attach to the fascia in the side areas adjacent to thekeypad. The leg sensors can sense when a keypad cover leg has beenremoved from its normal attachment position. These embodiments alsoinclude positioning at least one sensor so as to sense the distance toan overlying surface above the keypad. The sensor(s) can be used inverifying that the inside surface of the authorized keypad cover ispresent. The sensor(s) can also be used in verifying that the insidesurface is in its expected position. For example, the sensor can sensewhether the inside surface is much closer than normal. A determinationof a closer (or further outward) cover can be an indication of afraudulent cover. The sensing/detection of distances can be done duringtimes when a user's fingers would not be expected to be adjacent to thekeypad.

As previously discussed, inductance sensors and other types of sensorscan also be used to verify if a keypad cover is present, absent, or outof normal position (e.g., a pre-measured and stored distance orposition). Thus, example arrangements discussed herein can provide forimmediate detection and automatic notification (via a computermessage/warning) regarding removal of a keypad cover. The exampleability to detect removal of a keypad cover can help thwart a criminalfrom clandestinely attaching a fraudulent keypad overlying structure,which structure may be capable of detecting (skimming) a customer'skeypad inputs. Again, the example arrangements can assist in reducingfraud at automated banking machines.

An inductance sensor adjacent to the keypad may also be operative tosense changes in the makeup of the structure of (or associated with) thekeypad cover. For example, criminals may attempt to attach amicro-camera within the interior area of the keypad cover so as to viewfinger contacts with the keys. Such a micro-camera is representedschematically as 468 in FIG. 57. The installation of a micro-camerawithin the keypad cover will generally cause a change that is detectableby an inductance sensor or other sensor type. Such a change may bedetermined through operation of the at least one processor in thecircuitry 462. The circuitry may operate responsive to the determinationto provide at least one notifying output that corresponds to anindication of a probable fraud event.

In still other embodiments, sensor 646 may comprise one or more imagingsensors. Such imaging sensors may include sensors which are operative tocapture image data corresponding to objects within the interior area ofthe keypad cover. Such sensors may include a complementary metal oxidesemiconductor (CMOS) sensor or a micro/miniature camera. Such imagingsensors may determine visual changes to the interior of the keypad coverwhich may correspond to the installation of a camera or other deviceintended to intercept user inputs. In some example embodiments, theimage data can be captured and analyzed through operation of one or moreprocessors in the analysis circuitry so as to detect conditions duringtimes when no user's fingers are present within the interior area.Changes which may correspond to an unauthorized camera installationwithin the keypad cover can be determined through operation of one ormore processors and signals corresponding to the determination sent tothe terminal controller. Of course these approaches are example, and inother embodiments other approaches employing the principles describedmay be used to determine conditions which correspond to probabletampering and/or the installation of criminal devices designed to acceptuser inputs.

As can be seen, various example embodiments have been provided fordetecting the presence of a camera (or other fraudulent structure)installed within a keypad cover. As previously discussed, an inductancesensor can be positioned in the area of the keypad. The inductancesensor can sense a change in the properties of the keypad cover if acamera has been inserted therein. As previously discussed, anotherexample approach is to have an authorized camera (or other imagingsensor) looking upward from the keypad toward the keypad cover. Thecamera is associated with a processor that can identify a structuraland/or visible change within the inside of the keypad cover. By beingable to determine a change in the appearance of the interior of thekeypad cover, the presence of an unauthorized device can be determined.

As can be seen from the above discussions, an example embodimentincludes an apparatus comprising an automated banking machine, whereinthe machine is associated with at least one computer, wherein themachine includes a card reader, wherein the card reader includes a cardentry opening, wherein the card reader is operable to read from usercards, user data that corresponds to financial accounts, wherein thecard reader is in operative connection with the at least one computer,wherein the at least one computer is operative to cause the card readerto read user data from user cards, wherein the machine also includes acash dispenser, wherein the cash dispenser is operable to dispense cashfrom the machine, wherein the cash dispenser is in operative connectionwith the at least one computer, wherein the at least one computer isoperative, responsive at least in part to a determination that user dataread by the card reader corresponds to a financial account with which acash dispense transaction is authorized to be carried out with themachine, to cause the cash dispenser to dispense cash, wherein the atleast one computer is also operative to cause the financial account tobe assessed a value associated with the cash dispensed, wherein themachine also includes a housing, wherein the housing bounds an interiorarea, wherein the housing is associated with bezel support structure,wherein the bezel support structure is configured to operatively supportdifferent card slot bezels only one at a time, wherein the differentcard slot bezels are interchangeable with the machine, wherein thedifferent card slot bezels include at least a first card slot bezel anda second card slot bezel, wherein the first card slot bezel includes afirst card slot, wherein the first card slot bezel also includes a firstexterior surface, wherein the first exterior surface comprises a firstcontoured profile, wherein the first contoured profile surrounds thefirst card slot, wherein the second card slot bezel includes a secondcard slot, wherein the second card slot bezel also includes a secondexterior surface, wherein the second exterior surface comprises a secondcontoured profile, wherein the second contoured profile surrounds thesecond card slot, wherein the second contoured profile differs from thefirst contoured profile, wherein the differing contoured profiles areconfigured to reduce ability of a same fraudulent card reader beingattachable adjacent to each of the first card slot and the second cardslot, wherein the machine also includes at least one lock, wherein theat least one lock is in operative connection with the housing, whereinthe at least one lock is operable to control access to the interiorarea, wherein when a respective card slot bezel of the different cardslot bezels is operatively supported by the bezel support structure,then at least one fastener releasibly holds the respective card slotbezel in fixed operatively supported engagement with the bezel supportstructure, and the at least one fastener is manually movable to releasethe respective card slot bezel from fixed operatively supportedengagement with the bezel support structure, wherein when the first cardslot bezel is operatively supported by the bezel support structure, thenthe first card slot is aligned with the card entry opening, whichenables a user card to be moved in the first card slot to the card entryopening, wherein when the second card slot bezel is operativelysupported by the bezel support structure, then the second card slot isaligned with the card entry opening, which enables a user card to bemoved in the second card slot to the card entry opening.

Furthermore, in an example embodiment the machine includes a wirelessreader, wherein the wireless reader is operable to wirelessly receivebezel data transmitted by a card slot bezel positioned adjacent thehousing, wherein the at least one computer is operative to determinebased at least in part on bezel data received by the wireless reader,whether an authorized card slot bezel is positioned adjacent thehousing. Each of the different card slot bezels is an authorized cardslot bezel, wherein each of the different card slot bezels is operativeto wirelessly transmit bezel data, wherein the at least one computer isoperative to determine based at least in part on bezel data received bythe wireless reader, whether one of the different card slot bezels ispositioned adjacent the housing. The at least one computer is operativeto determine based at least in part on the bezel data received by thewireless reader, whether an authorized card slot bezel was removed frommachine. The machine also includes at least one sensor, wherein the atleast one sensor is operable to detect a card slot bezel operativelysupported by the bezel support structure, wherein the at least onecomputer is in operative connection with the at least one sensor,wherein the at least one computer is operative to determine based atleast in part on detection of a respective card slot bezel by the atleast one sensor, whether the respective card slot bezel is properlypositioned relative to the bezel support structure. When the first cardslot bezel is operatively supported by the bezel support structure, thenat least one first fastener releasibly holds the first card slot bezelin fixed operatively supported engagement with the bezel supportstructure, wherein the at least one first fastener is manually movableto release the first card slot bezel from fixed operatively supportedengagement with the bezel support structure. The at least one firstfastener is only accessible from within the interior area. When thesecond card slot bezel is operatively supported by the bezel supportstructure, then the at least one first fastener releasibly holds thesecond card slot bezel in fixed operatively supported engagement withthe bezel support structure. The first card slot bezel can include theat least one first fastener, wherein the at least one first fastener isan integral part of the first card slot bezel. The bezel supportstructure includes at least one connection slot, wherein the at leastone first fastener is resilient, wherein the at least one first fasteneris configured to snap fit into the at least one connection slot, whereinthe bezel support structure includes the at least one first fastener.The first card slot bezel includes at least one connection slot, whereinthe at least one first fastener is resilient, and the at least one firstfastener is configured to snap fit into the at least one connectionslot. When the second card slot bezel is operatively supported by thebezel support structure, then the at least one first fastener releasiblyholds the second card slot bezel in fixed operatively supportedengagement with the bezel support structure. The at least one firstfastener can be removably attachable to both the first card slot bezeland the bezel support structure, wherein the at least one first fastenercomprises at least one screw. The at least one first fastener caninclude a bezel lock, wherein the at least one bezel lock is inoperative connection with the first card slot bezel, wherein the atleast one bezel lock is operable to lock the first card slot bezel tothe bezel support structure, and wherein the at least one bezel lock isaccessible from outside of the machine. Each respective different cardslot bezel can comprise a bezel insert and a bezel housing, wherein foreach respective different card slot bezel: the bezel housing isconfigured to be held in fixed operatively supported engagement with thebezel support structure; the bezel insert is removable attachable to thebezel housing; and the bezel insert includes the contoured profile;wherein the contoured profile differs from every other contoured profileof the different card slot bezels.

As can be seen from the above discussions, another example embodimentincludes an apparatus comprising an automated banking machine, whereinthe machine includes a user data reader, wherein the user data reader isoperable to read user data that corresponds to financial accounts,wherein the machine also includes a cash dispenser, wherein the cashdispenser is operable to dispense cash from the machine to an authorizeduser of the machine during a cash dispense transaction, wherein themachine also includes a housing, wherein the housing bounds an interiorarea, wherein the machine also includes a bezel, wherein the bezel isremovably attached to the housing, wherein the bezel includes a userdata receiving area, wherein the user data reader is operable to readuser data provided to the user data receiving area, wherein the bezelincludes an exterior surface, wherein the exterior surface has acontoured profile, wherein the contoured profile is adjacent the userdata receiving area, wherein the bezel also includes bezel data, whereinthe bezel data is usable to identify the bezel as a bezel authorized foruse with the machine, wherein the machine also includes a bezel datareader, wherein the bezel data reader is operable to wirelessly read thebezel data from the bezel.

Furthermore, in another example embodiment the user data readercomprises a card reader, the card reader includes a card accepting area(or card reader entry opening), and the user data receiving areacomprises a card slot. The machine includes at least one of: (i) thebezel including an RFID tag, wherein the RFID tag includes the bezeldata, the bezel data reader comprising an RF reader, wherein the RFreader is operable to wirelessly read the bezel data from the RFID tag;and (ii) the bezel including an NFC chip, wherein the NFC chip includesthe bezel data, the bezel data reader comprising an NFC reader, whereinthe NFC reader is operable to wirelessly read the bezel data from theNFC chip. The bezel can include an RFD tag, wherein the RFID tagincludes the bezel data, wherein the bezel data reader comprises an RFreader, wherein the RF reader is operable to wirelessly read the bezeldata from the RFD tag, wherein the RFID tag is programmable, wherein themachine is operable to store bezel data in the RFD tag, and wherein themachine is operable to update bezel data stored in the RFD tag aftereach transaction. The bezel can include an NFC chip, wherein the NFCchip includes the bezel data, wherein the bezel data reader comprises anNFC reader, wherein the NFC reader is operable to wirelessly read thebezel data from the NFC chip, wherein the NFC chip is programmable, andwherein the machine is operable to store bezel data in the NFC chip, andwherein the machine is operable to update bezel data stored in the NFCchip after each transaction. The machine includes an attachmentarrangement with which respective different bezels are respectivelyindividually removably attachable to the housing, wherein the bezelcomprises a first bezel that is attached to the housing via theattachment arrangement, wherein the apparatus further comprises a secondbezel, wherein the second bezel is attachable to the housing via theattachment arrangement, wherein the second bezel includes a user datareceiving area, wherein the user data reader is operable to read userdata provided to the user data receiving area of the second bezel,wherein the second bezel includes an exterior surface, wherein theexterior surface of the second bezel has a different contoured profilethat differs from the contoured profile of the first bezel, wherein thedifferent contoured profile is adjacent the user data receiving area ofthe second bezel, wherein the second bezel includes different bezeldata, wherein the different bezel data is usable to identify the secondbezel as a bezel authorized for use with the machine, and wherein whenthe second bezel is attached to the housing via the attachmentarrangement, the bezel data reader is operable to wirelessly read thedifferent bezel data from the second bezel.

As previously discussed, different embodiments can provide differentmethods for interfering with or jamming fraudulent card readers (e.g.,skimmers). In some embodiments (e.g., FIG. 41) electromagnetic radiationis directed toward an area outside of and adjacent to the card entryslot. An electrical coil or toroid may be used to emit theelectromagnetic radiation. The emitted radiation can be in the form ofelectromagnetic pulses. The pulses may be randomly varied in frequencyand duration. In some embodiments the emitters can transmit signals on aplurality of different frequencies to produce so much noise that theinformation encoded on the magnetic stripe of the card cannot bedetermined by a skimmer. The emitters can also vary their emittedsignals in correspondence with variations in speed and/or direction ofthe card as it is moved toward the card entry slot. For example, aprocessor, based on received card speed data, can vary the interferenceradiation being output so as to achieve maximum jamming to preventunauthorized interception of valid card data.

Further example embodiments allow for jamming a fraudulent card readerfrom properly reading valid card data. For example, example jamming canfurther include an ability to: transmit harmonically relatedfrequencies; transmit magnetic signals in binary; transmit various waveforms; transmit random frequencies; transmit pulses that hide a card'sreversal of direction; transmit jamming signals by use of resonantantennas; and/or transmit the jamming signals earlier. Additionaljamming can be provided by transmitting at least one frequency thatmatches at least one speed of the card.

A card skimmer may have a coil that can convert a magnetic field intoelectrical signals. A read head can then read card data from theseelectrical signals. The example jamming signals are configured tointerfere with the ability of the skimmer to read data (in the clear)from a magnetic field.

The jamming can be provided by use of a jammer (which may also bereferred to herein as a jamming device or a jamming system). The jammercan comprise at least one emitter, at least one processor, sensors, andat least one data store. The emitter is controlled by the processor. Theprocessor is in operative connection with the sensors and the datastore. The sensors can be used to notify the processor when a card isbeing inserted toward the machine's card reader. Upon detection of auser card, the processor can cause the emitter to produce magnetic fieldjamming signals. Alternatively, an emitter may be operated tocontinuously produce the jamming signals, regardless of any carddetection.

Different sensor arrangements can be used to sense the presence of acard. The sensors may be proximity sensors, and/or magnetic stripesensors, etc. For example, one or more sensors can be located adjacentto the card entry slot. Other arrangements may have sensors locatedoutwards from the slot, such as in a fascia portion that leads to theslot. Another arrangement may have sensors that detect the opening of apath gate that provides card access to the card reader. Differentarrangements and methods for sensing cards may be of the mannerdescribed in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/404,643 filed Feb. 24,2012 and Ser. No. 13/667,620 filed Nov. 2, 2012 the disclosures of whichare herein incorporated by reference in their entirety.

In example embodiments, the magnetic field jamming signals areconfigured to have a strength that is sufficient to interfere with thereading ability of a skimmer. However, the jamming signals are notsufficient to erase data from a high-coercivity magnetic stripe (ordamage the stripe).

The jamming signals can also be directional. That is, they can bepurposely pointed to the location(s) where a skimmer would likely beattached. As a result, the jamming signals would not be presented(active) in an area that would cause interference with the readingability of the machine's card reader.

FIG. 58 shows a magnetic field emitter 900 in the form of a coil. Thecoil emitter 900 can surround a card entry slot 902 to a card reader.The coil is operable to convert electrical (jamming) signal(s) into amagnetic field(s). The generated magnetic field can cover an areaoutwardly adjacent to the slot and also at least a portion of the slotarea. The slot can part of a single bezel component 904. The coil can belocated inside (integral with) the bezel structure. Alternatively, thecoil can be attached to the rear side of the card entry slot bezel 904.The bezel can be part of a machine that has a card reader. For example,the bezel may be a replaceable part of a user fascia for an automatedbanking machine.

FIG. 59 shows a card entry slot arrangement 908 that is similar to thearrangement shown in FIG. 58, but a different type of emitter isemployed. For example, directional magnetic field emitters 910 can beused. The emitters may have the shape of a cylindrical tube. Eachemitter 910 is operable to generate a magnetic field that directionallycovers an area both in and outward of the card entry slot. The outwardlydirected signals can limit magnetic field interference to the interiorlylocated card reader. The emitters may be operated in combination, inrotation, and/or randomly. For example, a first emitter may output afirst jamming signal followed by a partially overlapping second jammingsignal emitted from a second emitter.

The jammer system may be part of an anti-skimmer kit or unit. The kitcan be retrofit to an automated banking machine. That is, the kit can bean aftermarket add-on device that gets installed on an existingautomated banking machine. In some embodiments the kit can be installedwithout being integrated with the machine circuitry (e.g., machinecontroller). However, in other embodiments the installed kit can beintegrated into the circuitry (and control) of the machine, includingthe circuitry of the card reader. The kit can also include its own powersource and operate completely independent of an automated bankingmachine.

In an example embodiment a jammer is operable to transmit (outputs)magnetic field signals at two or more frequencies that are harmonicallyrelated to the magnetic field frequencies used by a card skimmer to readthe data from the magnetic stripe of a user card. By outputting magneticfields at harmonically related frequencies to magnetic fields from whichthe card skimmer is trying to capture data, the jamming signals can bemore effective at interfering with the ability of the skimmer to readdata (in the clear) from a magnetic field.

An example automated banking machine can read magnetic stripe data froma plurality of different cards. Such cards include bank cards, creditcards, debit cards, driver's licenses, etc. A card's magnetic stripe cancomprise multiple different tracks. For example, track 1 may includedata that is related to a user's name. Track 2 may include data that isrelated to an account number. Track 3 can include miscellaneous datathat may be unique to the card system. A card may have tracks 1 and 3being 210 bits per inch, with track 2 being 75 bits per inch. Eachencoded character on the magnetic stripe can comprise a number of bits.Several schemes exist to determine whether a bit is a 1 or a 0. Forexample, where each bit has the same physical length on the stripe, thena polarity change in the bit can be used to indicate a 1. The absence ofsuch polarity change can indicate a 0.

Some readers can read a card while the card is being manually moved. Thespeed of the card corresponds to the frequency of the stripe's magneticfield. Again, each bit (0 or 1) has the same physical length (distance).Thus, the speed (distance/time) of a card can be determined by measuringthe time (one dock cycle) from when a bit begins to when the bit ends.The beginning of a track can include a series of 0 bits. The speed ofthese series of 0 bits can be used as the speed of the whole card. Thatis, the speed (frequency) of a card can be determined by measuring thespeed of only a few initial bits. It follows that whether a bit is a 1or a 0 bit can then be determined based on whether a polarity changeoccurred within the time of one bit cycle.

FIG. 60 shows a portion of a magnetic stripe of a user card. Also shownare the related characteristics of magnetic flux, bits, and waveformwhich directly correspond to the magnetic stripe portion. A bit lengthof one dock cycle is also shown. Example embodiments discussed hereinprevent a skimmer from being able to accurately read magnetic stripedata in such magnetic flux, bits, and waveform in the clear. In someembodiments interference is generated by signals that prevent (interferewith) skimmer reading. In other embodiments false data is generated forthe skimmer to read. For example, the skimmer can read a total amount ofdata which includes the false (invalid) data intermingled with the(valid) card data.

A track 2 format may include a 5-bit scheme (4 data bits+1 parity) whichallows for sixteen possible characters, which are the numbers 0-9 plussix punctuation symbols. The data format may be as follows: a startsentinel (one character); the primary account number (PAN); a separator(one character); a card expiration date; a service code; discretionarydata; an end sentinel (one character); and a longitudinal redundancycheck (LRC). The LRC can be a validity character calculated from otherdata on the track. The track data can be related to each other in aratio. For example, both the track 1 data and the track 3 data may berelated to the track 2 data in a 2.80:1 ratio (i.e., 210175). This ratiocan indicate that there are 2.80 as many flux reversals on track 1 andtrack 3 in comparison to track 2.

The example jamming embodiment can take advantage of track ratio. Askimmer head may be designed to primarily try to capture a stripe'saccount number data on track 2. However, card data in the various tracksmay be received at different rates by the skimmer head. An exampleembodiment includes using a jammer to transmit false card data in amagnetic field frequency ratio that is close to the magnetic striperatio. For example, the outputted magnetic field frequency ratio can beset at 3:1. This ratio would allow the interference data to correspondto data from any of the tracks. Transmitting in harmonically relatedfrequencies will provide pulses in the skimmer's read heads that will beincorrectly interpreted as valid data. That is, transmittinginterference data at a rate of three times the track 2 rate (or close tothe data rate on tracks 1 and 3 ) makes it very difficult to interpretwhat “good” data was sensed by a skimmer head. As a result, the skimmeris overloaded with useless data that appears (to the skimmer operation)to be captured valid card data.

As previously noted, a card's track format may include a 5-bit scheme. Afurther example embodiment takes advantage of such bit scheme. Theembodiment produces jamming that inserts two errors per five bit words.These errors function to fool the LRC. Two errors per six bit words mayalso be employed. In other embodiment, jamming is configured to denydock pulses.

Still other embodiments can interleave jamming signals. That is,different signals (or portions thereof) can be alternatively inserted(mixed) together. A portion of a first signal can be inserted betweenadjacent portions of a second signal. This inserting (or combining) ofsignals can be carried out on a regular basis such that all portions ofthe first signal eventually get mixed in with the second signal.

FIG. 61 shows an example of an example jammer 920. The jammer can causea summing 922 of multiple (e.g., two) frequencies. A driver circuit cardassembly (CCA) 924 includes pulse width modulators (PWM) 926, 928. ThePWM signal modulation can cause the widths of pulses to correspond tospecific data values. Also shown is a cable 930 and an antenna 932. Theantenna may be a differential drive-tuned type of antenna. A voltagestanding-wave ratio (VSWR) measurement arrangement 934 can be used tomonitor the signal quality and maintain efficient transmission ofradio-frequency power to the antenna 932. Again, the interleaved jammingsignals also include data that (magnetically) looks like card data tothe skimmer. If the jamming can cause the skimming operation to acceptone false character in interpreting a customer's PAN, then theoreticallythe jamming will have succeeded in preventing the valid account numberfrom being known.

In another example embodiment, a jammer session uses (against a skimmer)the skimmer's ability to interpret characters or numbers (0-9) from amagnetic field. That is, a skimmer may be able to view respectivenumbers (e.g., zero and one) as being represented in respective patternsin a magnetic field. If a magnetic pattern can be sensed by a skimmer,then the pattern can be converted into its corresponding number. Thus,the skimmer can interpret (read) the numbers (0-9).

However, an example jammer can transmit magnetic field signals thatcomprise data in binary. The combined binary data (Os and 1 s) wouldcorrespond to actual characters or numbers (e.g., 0 to 9).

The jamming signals can also include start/stop characters that arenormally found on a magnetic stripe. A card's data to be read is locatedbetween the start and stop characters. Thus, a skimmer operation can beconfused as to where data from a single card begins and ends. A skimmeroperation's interpretation of when a particular card's data concludeswould be premature (or late). Likewise, the interpretation of when theparticular card's data starts would be premature (or late).

The example output of false data that corresponds in binary to theactual kinds of card data that would be found on a valid magneticstripe, will effectively confuse a recording device connected to askimmer. By transmitting actual values that correspond to false carddata, the collected skimmer data (which is commonly recorded as a pulsestream in a type of a recorder device) will include invalid card datathat is indiscernible from any captured valid card data. In anotherexample embodiment, a jammer is operable to transmit a varying set ofwave forms as a jamming signal. Again, flux reversals may be used as afairly consistent set of values, which allows them to be interpreted asOs and Is. Thus, having various wave forms in a magnetic output willalso interfere with any effort to capture the data off the card.Changing the jamming signal wave form and/or frequency also changes theamplitude and frequency of the magnetic pulses that are output by thejamming device. By varying the magnetic pulses across a range duringeach card reading transaction, the goal is to have the jamming dataclosely correspond to the frequency of the actual card data as read by aread head during at least part of the reading activity. That is, varyingthe jamming signal waveform and/or frequency offers a high probabilitythat at least part of the card's pulse shape and frequency will bematched, and thus jammed. Again, this will make it difficult for askimming operation to discern what obtained data is actually valid carddata.

In another example embodiment, a jammer is operable to transmit a randomset of frequencies during a jamming session. Random frequencies make itmore difficult to process captured card data and recover the fluxreversals that were read from the card. One jamming approach is tooverwhelm a card skimmer by transmitting (with a same frequency) strongmagnetic noise that avoids the card data from being (accurately) read.However, through sophisticated electronic filtering techniques,criminals may be able to filter out noise and recover some valid carddata. An example embodiment uses more random types of signal frequenciesalong with signals that appear to be valid card data, to makes it moredifficult for a skimming operation to recover the actual valid signalthat corresponds to valid data from the card.

The random sets of magnetic field frequencies might also be harmonicallyrelated, such as by being various multiples of previously transmittedrandom frequencies. The signal frequencies can be made to randomly “hop”(using different sizes of steps) so as not to change in a consistent ordetectable manner. Hop enables there to be no predetermined multiplerelationship between the current frequency being output and the nextfrequency that will be output. Because the frequency multiples arerandom, it becomes difficult for a skimming operation to predict thecurrent jamming frequency, and thus reduces the probability that theactual card data can be recovered by the skimming operation. Again, theexample transmitting of magnetic field generating signals at randomfrequencies renders it unlikely that a skimming operation can recoverusable valid card data.

The output of magnetic fields at random frequencies is particularlyadvantageous to jam a skimmer located adjacent a card reader thatdepends on the user to insert and remove theft card. An example of sucha card reader is a “dip” type of reader or a “swipe” type of reader.With such readers, frequencies are influenced by how fast a card ismanually moved (dipped) during a card reading direction. For example,with some dip readers the card data can be read while the card is beingmoved out of the reader (in the exit direction).

Because the card is being manually moved (instead of being moved by aconstant mechanical drive), the card may not be moving at a constant(same) speed during reading of the magnetic stripe data. As a result,the example ability to provide jamming signals at different frequenciesincreases the likelihood that a skimmer will be influenced by at leastone jamming frequency.

In another example embodiment, a jammer is operable to transmit afrequency that is matched to the insertion/removal speed of a cardrelative to the card reader. That is instead of outputting randomfrequencies, a more precise frequency for the current situation can becalculated for usage. Card speed can be an important factor because thespeed at which flux reversals can be read by a card skimmer may dependon how fast the card is moving. Thus, the example jamming embodimentincludes an ability to sense the speeds (or relative differences inspeeds) of a moving card, and then vary the jamming signal in accordancewith sensed card speed so that the signal has a relationship to the cardspeed. The processor of the jammer can be operated to perform the cardspeed calculations in real time.

In some types of card readers a card may be mechanically moved, such asin a motorized card reader. The card reading mechanism can includemoving members (e.g., belts and/or rollers) that operate to engage andmove a card. The mechanical arrangement allows the moving members to beoperated at a constant speed. Thus, the (constant) speed of these movingmembers (e.g., belts and/or drive rollers) can be sensed or determinedby the jammer. As previously noted, in other types of card readers thecard holder (machine user) manually moves the card. Such reader typesinclude a dip card reader and a swipe card reader. Hence, the card maybe moved at various (different) speeds. These speeds can be determinedby use of sensors. Contact roller sensors can be used. Likewise, CMOS(complementary metal-oxide semiconductor) sensors can be used. A CMOSsensor can operate (in a manner similar to a computer mouse) to senseobject (card) movement by comparing captured images. Differentarrangements and methods for sensing with a CMOS sensor may be of themanner described in U.S. Pat. No. 8,225,989, the disclosure of which isherein incorporated by reference in its entirety. A micro/miniaturecamera may similarly be used to capture images of card movement. Thejammer's processor is in operative connection with the sensors, cameras,etc. The speed of a card can be determined from sensed or captured cardmovement. For example, the processor can use the timing between capturedimages of a card to determine the speed of the card. As previouslydiscussed, the speed (frequency) of a card may also be magneticallydetermined by measuring the passing speed of only a few initial bits.

An example embodiment allows for transmitting a frequency that matchesthe determined insertion and/or removal speed of a card. That is, thejammer can determine a card's insertion and/or exit speed(s) and thengenerate a transmission frequency that matches the determined speed(s).The generated jamming signal can also be combined with transmittingvalid character sets that correspond to false card data. Furthermore,these particular character sets (of false data) can be varied for eachcard reading transaction.

The example jammer is operable to transmit a frequency that isharmonically related (e.g., matched) to a calculated speed of a card.The calculations and matching can occur in real time. The jammer canoutput pulse signals that correspond to the actual card speed. Theseoutputted pulse signals include false data that confuses what skimmerdata is recorded as a pulse stream in a data recording device. Thisjamming makes it difficult to recover the actual (valid) data becausethe false jamming data is so (frequency) close to the real card data.Furthermore, not only can the jamming data be output at the actual speedof the card, but it also can include false card data which is randomlyvaried. The jamming combinations interfere with criminal ability toeliminate (filter) false card data from real card data.

In another example embodiment, a jammer is operable to transmit magneticpulses that hide (mask) a card's reversal of direction from a cardskimmer. An example card reader utilizes sensed card jitter to indicatereversal of direction and/or speed changes as the card is moved relativeto the (motorized) card reader. The valid card reader can use this cardjitter data to accurately read the card's data.

If a skimmer is able to gather card jitter data, then this may allow theskimming operation to identify from the gathered jitter data, when acard's direction was reversed and when the card's speed was changed. Theeffects of the identified jitter can be removed (filtered out) by theskimming operation to recover the actual (good, valid) card data. As aresult of being able to use card jitter data, valid card data may berecovered by the skimming operation. Thus, the embodiment tries toprevent a skimmer from similarly sensing and then utilizing card jitter.The example jamming embodiment operates to produce jitter-jamming pulses(magnetic field outputs) that prevent a skimmer from being able torecognize (identify, determine) that a card's direction was actuallyreversed. That is, the example jammer prevents the skimmer from sensingthe reality of the card movement. The jamming prevents the skimmer fromrecognizing the fact that the user card actually slowed down, thenstopped, and then reversed direction. Thus, the jammer can cause theskimming operation to be tricked into a false interpretation that thecard is still moving in a same direction and at a same (constant) speed.A further example jamming embodiment operates to producejitter-appearing pulses that causes a skimmer to obtain data thatfalsely indicates that a card's direction was reversed. That is, thejammer is operable to transmit magnetic pulses that appear (to a cardskimmer) that a card reversed its direction when in reality the card didnot change direction. As a result, the skimmer is tricked into obtaining(reading) at least some false data. Thus, the skimmer is at leastprevented from obtaining all of the actual (real, valid) card data.

Again, a skimming operation may cause collected skimmer data to berecorded (stored) as a pulse stream in some kind of data recordingdevice. However, because of the example jamming effects, it becomes muchmore difficult for the skimming operation to properly recover valid carddata from this stored pulse stream data. That is, because jamming causedat least some false data to be inserted into (be a part of) the totaldata obtained by the skimmer, and because the jamming also prevented atleast some valid card data from being read by the skimmer, the abilityof the skimming operation to determine (reproduce) useable valid carddata from the total data obtained is unlikely.

FIG. 62 shows an example of a waveform representation of generatedjamming signal(s). FIG. 63 shows magnetic flux reversals that would beread by the magnetic read head of a skimmer. FIG. 64 shows bitinterpretation of the false card data that would be gathered and storedin a recording device associated with the skimmer. FIG. 65 shows amagnetic stripe arrangement that would have similarly caused themagnetic flux of FIG. 63. The example makes a skimmer operate as thoughit were reading the magnetic stripe (of FIG. 65) from a nearby card,when in reality it is reading fictitious data being output in at leastone jamming signal that was generated by an example jammer.

As can be seen (e.g., FIGS. 62 and 63), the jamming includes differencesin signal strength. The shown pair of Ls are in a strong signal that hasa relatively high amplitude. The jamming also includes a change insignal frequency. The frequency change is representative of a fictitiousincrease in card speed from V-1 to V-2 (e.g., FIG. 63). A change in thebit rate dock cycle from L-1 to L-2 is also shown (e.g., FIG. 64).

As previously discussed, the example jammer has an ability to providemany different jamming signals, including jamming operations that followpredetermined signal output patterns. The jammer can also operate tocause (in real time) different or manipulated signals to be output basedon information newly sensed or determined. For example, as previouslydiscussed, the jammer can react to a change in card speed to modifysignal output to reflect the speed change. That is, the jammersprocessor can operate in real time to analyze many variables, determinethe most favorable (optimum) jamming signals for the situation, and thencause the optimum jamming signals to be emitted. As can be appreciated,the jammer is not statically operated to repeatedly emit the samejamming signal. Rather, the jammer is dynamically operated (programmed)to emit optimum jamming signals that directly correspond to (best match)the current card reading operation.

Also, upon sensing a card (o a person) adjacent to the machine (e.g.,the card entry slot), the processor can begin causing the output ofdifferent jamming signals of various frequencies (e.g., randomfrequencies). However, after the speed of the card is determined thenthe processor can target (select) a frequency that more closely matchesthe determined card speed. That is, in an example embodiment theprocessor first operates (following detection of a card) to present awide (first) range of jamming frequencies before the speed of thedetected card is determined, then the processor operates (switches) topresent a narrower (second) range of jamming frequencies that are inbetter harmony (agreement) with the known card speed. Thus, theprocessor in a jamming process for an individual card can cause outputsthat range from broad frequencies to more exact frequencies as moreinformation about the card is determined by the processor. Again,jamming signals that are based on unknown speed (of a card) can beimmediately followed by more accurate jamming signals that are based onknown speed (of the card). Thus, different jamming signals based onpre-known speed and post-known speed can be used to provide a moreefficient process of jamming unauthorized card reading. As previouslydiscussed, the output of various frequencies can produce variousmagnetic (jamming) fields. In another example embodiment, resonantantennas are used to transmit the magnetic field jamming signals. Aresonant antenna allows a signal to be provided that is more effectivelysensed by the magnetic read head of a card skimmer. For example, theexample resonant antenna can output reinforced and/or prolonged signals.The signals can continue to resonate for long periods of time. Alongwith sending valid formats (patterns, lengths) of card data, theresonant jamming operation will make it more difficult for a skimmingoperation to recover valid card data from the total amount of datacollected. The total data may comprise valid card data, but it will beseverely mixed (intermingled) with the false jamming data. In a furtherexample embodiment, one or more resonant antennas are used to causeresonating at different frequencies. A further example embodiment causesjamming to begin earlier. Various arrangements and methods of jamming acard skimmer have already been discussed. For earlier initiation ofjamming, one or more sensors are used to sense a user card earlier. Forexample, as previously discussed, a card may be sensed when a cardportion enters the card entry slot. Various types of sensors can be usedto sense the card. For example, as previously discussed one or moreproximity sensors in the form of an optical sensor, a magnetic sensor,and/or a sound (radar) sensor may be used.

Furthermore, a jammer can be operated to send a false start readingsignal to a skimmer. This false start signal can be sent upon apre-reading (early) sensing of a card. This false start signal causesthe skimmer to prematurely begin collecting data. Along with emittingthe false start signal, the jammer can at the same time also beginemitting false card data. That is, the skimmer can be made to start“reading” (false) stripe data before the magnetic stripe is actually ina position which allows its valid data to be read by the skimmer. Thus,the ability to provide early sensing of a card can be used to cause theskimmer to prematurely collect data, where the data collectedconstitutes useless false data. As can be appreciated, the embodimentfurther reduces the risk that the skimmer will recover any useful data.

The processor includes programming (software, firmware, etc.) thatallows a logic flow of steps which cause jamming operations to becarried out. As previously discussed, some jamming operations includeuse of an emitter that is only turned on upon detection of a card, elsethe emitter is kept off. Sensors can be used to detect: hand movement inan approach channel to the card slot; a card adjacent the slot; and/omovement of a gate to the card reader. The processor receives signalsfrom the sensors. The processor determines whether any of the receivedsignals correspond to a card being inserted. If positive, then theprocessor causes the emitter to output signals that form a magneticfield. The signals can be emitted in a pattern or a format. Thegenerated magnetic field has a strength which can vary. The pattern hasa frequency which can vary. The pattern can be predetermined (known).The processor can obtain different predetermined patterns from the datastore. The predetermined jamming pattern that is obtained can includefalse (fictitious) card data. Alternatively, the processor can produce arandom jamming pattern of signals ((within a range), which includesrandom card data. The output of random jamming signals creates a randommagnetic field.

As previously discussed, some jamming operations include use of anemitter that is always kept on. The processor can cause the emitter tooutput different jamming signals that form varying magnetic fields. Theoutputted signals can follow a predetermined jamming pattern or a randomjamming pattern. The fictitious magnetic field that is generatedincludes false data which a card skimmer may interpret as valid carddata. A jamming magnetic field may also be of such high strength that itoverwhelms the ability of a card skimmer to accurately read card data.The jammers processor can determine the operational status of thejamming signal emitter. An example jammer is configured to beoperatively connected to a machine's card reader. The connection isconfigured to provide backup protection to the card reader. Because ofthe protective configuration, if the emitter (or jammer) becomesinoperable, then the card reader is automatically taken out of service.For example, if any part of the jammer loses power, then theconfiguration is designed to cause the card reader to also lose power(i.e., shut off power supply to card reader). Similarly, if any part ofthe jammer gets disconnected (e.g., by a criminal) from the remainder ofthe jammer, then the card reader is automatically shutdown. Also, if theemitter becomes inoperable then the processor can cause a notificationmessage to be wirelessly communicated to a proper authority, such as amachine servicer.

Thus, the features and characteristics of an example embodimentspreviously described achieve desirable results, eliminate difficultiesencountered in the use of prior devices and systems, solve problems, andmay attain one or more of the objectives stated above. In the foregoingdescription certain terms have been used for brevity, clarity andunderstanding, however no unnecessary limitations are to be impliedtherefrom because such terms are for descriptive purposes and areintended to be broadly construed. Moreover, the descriptions andillustrations herein are by way of examples and the invention is notlimited to the details shown and described.

In the following claims any feature described as a means for performinga function shall be construed as encompassing any means known to thoseskilled in the art to be capable of performing the recited function, andshall not be deemed limited to the particular means shown in theforegoing description or mere equivalents thereof.

The term “non-transitory” with regard to computer readable medium isintended to exclude only the subject matter of a transitory signal perse, where the medium itself is transitory. The term “non-transitory” isnot intended to exclude any other form of computer readable media,including media comprising data that is only temporarily stored orstored in a transitory fashion. Should the law change to allow computerreadable medium itself to be transitory, then this exclusion is nolonger valid or binding.

Having described the features, discoveries and principles of theinvention, the manner in which it is constructed and operated, and theadvantages and useful results attained; the new and useful structures,devices, elements, arrangements, parts, combinations, systems,equipment, operations, methods, processes and relationships are setforth in the appended claims.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method comprising: determining a speed of acard being read by a card reader, the card reader having a slot;operating a processor to determine at least one jamming pattern thatincludes a jamming signal at a frequency that matches the determinedspeed of the card being read by the card reader; a operating theprocessor to cause an emitter to output jamming signals that correspondto the at least one jamming pattern; determining a change in the speedof the card being read by the card reader; and varying the frequency tocorrespond to the determined change in the speed of the card being readby the card reader; wherein the jamming signals are configured toprevent accurate reading of card data by at least one read head of afraudulent card reader located adjacent to the slot.
 2. The methodaccording to claim 1, wherein the jamming signals include false carddata that is configured to appear as valid card data to the fraudulentcard reader.
 3. The method according to claim 1, wherein the jammingsignals include characters corresponding to card reader instructions toone of a group consisting of start reading and to stop reading.
 4. Themethod according to claim 1, wherein at least one of the jamming signalsrandomly hops frequencies.
 5. An apparatus, comprising: a card readerhaving a card entry slot; and a jammer arrangement; wherein the jammerarrangement comprises a processor, a sensor operable to determine aspeed of a card being moved within the card reader, and an emitter;wherein the processor is operable to operate the emitter to emit ajamming signal that has a frequency that matches the determined speed ofthe card being moved within the card reader.
 6. The apparatus set forthin claim 5, wherein the processor is operable to determine a change inspeed of the card being moved within the card reader; and wherein theprocessor is operable to vary the frequency of the jamming signal toaccording to the change in speed of the card being moved within the cardreader.
 7. The apparatus set forth in claim 6, wherein the emitter isoperable to emit a jamming signal that is directional magnetic fieldtowards the card reader's card entry slot.
 8. The apparatus set forth inclaim 5, wherein the jamming signal is at a frequency that matches oneof a group consisting of an insertion speed and removal speed of thecard.
 9. The apparatus set forth in claim 5, wherein the emitter tooutputs a plurality of jamming signals.
 10. The apparatus set forth inclaim 5, wherein the sensor includes a contact roller sensor; whereinthe processor is in operative connection with the contact roller sensor;and wherein the speed of the card is determined based at least in parton at least one sensing by the contact rover sensor.
 11. The apparatusset forth in claim 10 wherein the sensor includes a complementary metaloxide semiconductor (“CMOS”) sensor, and wherein the speed of the cardis determined based at least in part on sensing by the CMOS sensor. 12.The apparatus set forth in claim 5, wherein the emitter outputs aplurality of jamming signals at frequencies that are harmonicallyrelated to the speed of the card.
 13. The apparatus set forth in claim5, wherein the emitter to outputs a plurality of jamming signals thatcomprises random frequencies.
 14. The apparatus set forth in claim 5,wherein the emitter to outputs a plurality of jamming signals thatinclude false card data configured to appear as valid card data to thefraudulent card reader.
 15. The apparatus set forth in claim 5, whereinthe emitter to outputs a plurality of jamming signals that includecharacters corresponding to card reader instructions to one of a groupconsisting of start reading and to stop reading.
 16. The apparatus setforth in claim 5, further comprising a resonant antenna to emit thejamming signals coupled with the emitter.
 17. The apparatus set forth inclaim 5, wherein the emitter outputs a plurality of jamming signals thatare interleaved.
 18. The apparatus set forth in claim 5, wherein theprocessor is operate to insert one of a group consisting of two errorsper five bit word and two errors per six bit word into the jammingsignal.
 19. The apparatus set forth in claim 14, further comprising anautomated banking machine coupled with the card reader and the jammerarrangement, the automated banking machine comprises a cash dispenser;wherein the automated banking machine is associated with a computer thatis operable, responsive at least in part to a determination that userdata read by the card reader corresponds to a financial account usableto authorize a cash dispense transaction with the automated bankingmachine, to cause the cash dispenser to dispense cash, wherein thecomputer is further operable to cause the financial account to beassessed a value associated with an amount of cash dispensed.
 20. Atangible, non-transitory computer readable medium of instructions withinstructions encoded thereon for execution by a processor that whenexecuted by a processor are operable to: determine a speed of a cardmoving within a card reader; determine at least one jamming pattern forusage, wherein the pattern includes at least one frequency that matchesthe determined speed of the card; cause a signal emitter to outputjamming signals that correspond to the at least one jamming pattern;determine a change in the speed of the card moving within the cardreader; and vary a frequency of the jamming pattern to correspond to thechange in the speed; wherein the jamming signals are configured toprevent accurate reading of card data by at least one read head of afraudulent card reader located adjacent to the slot.